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INTRODUCTION
It is time for a new approach to international trade. Environmen-
talists and labor leaders in the United States have been saying so for many
years. Now, U.S. political leaders are saying so, too. During his 2008 presi-
dential election campaign, President Barack Obama pledged:
I will work with the leaders of Canada and Mexico
to fix NAFTA [“North American Free Trade Agreement”] so
that it works for [U.S.] workers. I believe that NAFTA and
its potential were oversold to the [U.S.] people.1 It has not
created the jobs and wealth that were promised. We can,
and must, make trade work for [U.S.] workers by opening
up foreign markets to U.S. goods and maintaining strong
labor and environmental standards.2
A new emphasis on making trade fair is evident in the U.S. Congress also.
In the November 2008 U.S. elections, “[a]t least 41 new [F]air-[T]raders
were elected to House and Senate seats, which represent a net gain of 33
in Congress’ overall economic justice contingent. This comes on top of the
37 net [F]air-[T]rade pick-ups in the 2006 congressional elections.”3
1 President Obama referred to “American” workers and people, as do many speakers from
the United States. Yet people in Mexico, Central America, and South America consider
themselves to be Americans. Therefore, in this article, remaining references to “American”
have been changed to “U.S.”
2 Massimo Calabresi, Where They Stand On: Trade, TIME, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.time
.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1855269_1855265_1855208,00.html.
3 Todd Tucker & Lori Wallach, Fair Trade Victory, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, Nov. 21, 2008,
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5692.
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These results of the 2008 federal elections parallel recent voicing
of opposition to free trade agreements. For example, the U.S.-Colombia
Free Trade Agreement is currently stalled in the U.S. Congress, and
talks in the Doha Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”)4 have made little progress.5 According to Xavier Becerra, U.S.
Representative from California, “I submit to you that our trade policies
are just not working—they are unworkable. We need to create a future
of beneficial trade growth by insisting on verifiable standards of conduct
in [the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement]
CAFTA[-DR].”6 He adds, “CAFTA[-DR] was the very first trade deal I have
voted against in my close to fourteen years of congressional service.”7
The elections of a new President and members of Congress who
are ready to revise the U.S. approach to trade show that the tides have
turned in the United States since January 1, 2006,8 when the CAFTA-DR
debuted quietly.9 At that time, while there was limited public discussion
of CAFTA-DR in the United States, citizens of other member countries
spoke up loudly against the free trade agreement. There was heated oppo-
sition to the agreement by citizens in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.10 The minimal public 
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.doc.
5 Matthew Bristow, Congress Won’t Pass US-Columbia Free-Trade Pact in ‘10—US Envoy,
TRUTH ABOUT TRADE & TECH., Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.truthabouttrade.org/news/latest
-news/15496-congress-wont-pass-us-colombia-free-trade-pact-in-10-us-envoy; Lawrence L.
Herman, International Trade At the Crossroads?, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE.COM, Mar. 2010,
http://www.financierworldwide.com/article.php?id=6244.
6 Xavier Becerra, CAFTA, Legal Reform and the Political Dimension, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 319, 320 (2006).
7 Id. at 328.
8 A bill is pending in Congress that would require a review of existing trade agreements
including, NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. The Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and
Employment Act, S. 2821, 111th Cong. § 3(b) (1st Sess. 2009), H.R. 3012, 111th Cong. § 3(b)
(1st Sess. 2009).
9 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Guat.-El Sal.-Hond.-
Nicar.-Costa Rica-Dom. Rep., Aug. 5, 2004, 19 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq., available at http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic
-central-america-fta/final-text [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
10 U.S. Trade Pact Is Protested in Costa Rica, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www
.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/world/americas/01costarica.html; see also Elisabeth Malkin,
Central American Trade Deal Is Being Delayed by Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/business/02cafta.html; see also James C. McKinley,
Jr., U.S. Trade Pact Divides the Central Americans, with Farmers and Others Fearful, 
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discussion of CAFTA-DR in the United States at the time of its debut also
sharply contrasted with the flurry of debate that occurred in the United
States when NAFTA was approved in 1993 and took effect in 1994.11
CAFTA-DR was ratified and implemented in El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Honduras, and Nicaragua by mid-2006, and it was passed by a
referendum in Costa Rica in October 2007.12 Its purpose is to “eliminate
tariffs and trade barriers and expand regional opportunities for the
workers, manufacturers, consumers, farmers, ranchers and service pro-
viders of all the [members].”13 In that vein, NAFTA and CAFTA-DR are
based on the assertion that their members will benefit from comparative
advantage.14 However, comparative advantage is only one feature that
CAFTA-DR and NAFTA are designed to deliver. NAFTA and CAFTA-DR
also set out to achieve the goal of sustainable development in their respec-
tive preambles, and CAFTA-DR speaks of it in Article 17.9.15
This article focuses on whether CAFTA-DR’s provisions are suffi-
cient to achieve sustainability. Therefore, a definition of sustainability
is necessary. In 1987, the United Nations (“UN”) sponsored the World
Commission on the Environment and Development (“World Commission”)
and released the results of a four-year study addressing ecological and
economic threats to Earth. Called the Brundtland Report, it was published
as Our Common Future.16 In it, the World Commission said, “[h]umanity
has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/international/americas/
21cafta.html; For discussion of protests in Costa Rica against CAFTA-DR and the Plan
Puebla Panama, an economic development plan facilitating CAFTA-DR, see Paulette L.
Stenzel, Plan Puebla Panama: An Economic Tool That Thwarts Sustainable Development
and Facilitates Terrorism, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 555, 591 (2006).
11 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; see, e.g., The ‘Great Debate’ over NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1993, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/09/opinion/the-great-debate
-over-nafta.html.
12 CAFTA Wins in Razor-Close Costa Rica Vote, ALTERNET, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www
.alternet.org/economy/64680/.
13 Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”), CAFTA-DR Final Text,
http://ustraderep.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/
Section_Index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
14 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT 22 (1993).
15 NAFTA, supra note 11, pmbl.; CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, pmbl., art. 17.9.
16 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987), available at http://
worldinbalance.net/pdf/1987-brundtland.pdf [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. The
report is sometimes referred to as the Brundtland Report due to the chairwomanship of
the World Commission by former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. Id.
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the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their own needs.”17
The World Commission’s emphasis on the needs of future gen-
erations aligns with the views of indigenous people of the Western Hemi-
sphere. Many indigenous people speak and think of the interdependence
of human beings; every action, even the smallest step, has effects now and
into the future.18 Their teachings emphasize that “[w]e cannot simply think
of our survival; each new generation is responsible to ensure the survival
of the seventh generation,” and “[t]he prophecy given to us, tells us that
what we do today will affect the seventh generation and because of this we
must bear in mind our responsibility to them today and always.”19 This
perspective is essential in the context of this article as it examines the
effects of CAFTA-DR on the people in its developing members, many of
whom are indigenous.
Going beyond basic definitions, it is important to talk about ways
to measure sustainable development. The Triple Bottom Line is one such
tool that describes what factors must be considered if companies and
individuals are to pursue sustainable practices and lives in meaningful
ways. It is defined as economy, social equity, and environment.20 Andrew
W. Savitz and Karl Weber say in their book The Triple Bottom Line,
“[s]ustainability in practice can be seen as the art of doing business in an
interdependent world.”21
17 Id. at 24. For discussion of the report and its effects, see ANDRES R. EDWARDS, THE
SUSTAINABILITY REVOLUTION: PORTRAIT OF A PARADIGM SHIFT 16–20 (2005).
18 This is from a 1992 report that draws upon the teachings of indigenous people of North
America and India. LINDA CLARKSON ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., OUR
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SEVENTH GENERATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 3, 19 (1992), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/seventh_gen.pdf.
19 Id. at 3, 24.
20 See, e.g., Goethe-Institute, Sustainability—From Principle to Practice, http://www.goethe
.de/ges/umw/dos/nac/den/en3106180.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2010) (referring to the “three
pillars of sustainability” of economy, environment, and social institutions); STAFF REPORT
TO THE CITY COUNCIL OF DAVIS, CALIFORNIA 7 (2009), available at http://cityofdavis.org/
meetings/councilpackets/20091215/07%20Community%20Sustainability%20Workshop
.pdf (the Report encourages a Sustainability Plan that will focus on environment, economy,
and society). This trilogy is also sometimes referred to as “people, planet, profits.” See, e.g.,
Catawba College, “People, Planet, Profits” Motivate Duke Energy’s Decisions, Oct. 2, 2008,
http://www.catawba.edu/news/archive/2008/10/02/ruff_dukeenergy.aspx. For clarity, the
term “social equity” is used in this article.
21 ANDREW W. SAVITZ & KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW TODAY’S BEST-RUN
COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS—AND HOW
YOU CAN TOO x (2006).
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Fifteen years of experience under NAFTA reveal that it promotes
development that is not sustainable as defined by the Triple Bottom Line.
Workers in various sectors of the economy in the United States and Mexico
have suffered, especially in Mexico. Congressperson Becerra says, “[w]e
have displaced over a million Mexican small farmers who can no longer
survive because they cannot compete with our agribusiness that sends
corn, wheat, and soybeans down to Mexico.”22
Moreover, NAFTA has led to increased social inequities and harm
to the natural environment. Based on experience under NAFTA and an
examination of current economic, social, and environmental conditions in
CAFTA-DR’s developing members, lawmakers and businesspeople cannot
assume that CAFTA-DR will lead to sustainable development. Therefore,
CAFTA-DR deserves close scrutiny by people in business, law, government,
and throughout society.
Through NAFTA, two developed countries, Canada and the United
States, joined forces with one developing country, Mexico.23 Through
CAFTA-DR, six developing countries are partners with one economic giant,
the United States.24 The developing members of CAFTA-DR share many
common characteristics.25 Poverty and unemployment levels are high.26 For
those who have jobs, wages are extremely low. For example, a Nicaraguan
worker in the agricultural sector lives on an average of $1.3827 per day,
while a Nicaraguan worker in the manufacturing sector lives on an aver-
age of $1.86 per day.28 The developing members share similar challenges
as they work to protect their agricultural sectors, reduce poverty, improve
infrastructure, pursue sustainable economic development, protect and clean
up the natural environment, and respect the cultures of their citizens. In
most, a majority of the population is completely or partially indigenous.29
22 Becerra, supra note 6, at 323.
23 See generally NAFTA, supra note 11.
24 See generally CAFTA-DR, supra note 9.
25 Some authors refer to the “Central American members,” but that label ignores the
Dominican Republic, a Caribbean country. Therefore, developing nation members of
CAFTA-DR will be referred to as “developing members” throughout this article.
26 Wilson Center OnDemand, Central America’s Economic Dilemma, http://www.wilson
center.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=Media.play&mediaid=536B275B-0F80 -4B6B
-CA3C49D5D6EE61E5 (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
27 Unless otherwise noted, all references to monetary amounts are in U.S. Dollars.
28 Don McIntosh, CAFTA Fight Boils Down to Who Will Benefit in Trade, NW. LAB. PRESS,
www.nwlaborpress.org/2005/5-20-05CAFTA.html (last visited Mar. 07, 2010).
29 See Donna Lee Van Cott, Latin America’s Indigenous Peoples, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 127,
128 tbl. (2007), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v018/18
.4van-cott.pdf.
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As a result, each country will face challenges as it strives to protect the cul-
ture and heritage of its people. Nevertheless, a look at one country pro-
vides perspectives on the problems of the various developing members.
This article shows that CAFTA-DR fails to meet the Triple Bottom
Line for its developing members. It begins with a survey, using examples
from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras. It then focuses on Nicaragua.30 Nicaragua is an apt choice for
focus because the United States has historically dominated its economy
and politics.31 It is also the poorest of the CAFTA-DR nations.32 In view
of the fact that the poor are those who suffer the most from unsustain-
able development, Nicaragua provides a heightened case for an exami-
nation of the threats posed by CAFTA-DR. Nicaragua provides a micro-
cosm to show why CAFTA-DR does not meet the Triple Bottom Line for its
developing members.
U.S. citizens share the problems faced by people in the developing
members of CAFTA-DR. These problems will not go away because they are
forgotten or repressed. The problems and their causes must be explored
if they are to be resolved in creative ways. This article explores the prob-
lems facing CAFTA-DR’s developing members, with a focus on Nicaragua.
It also proposes a framework for the pursuit of sustainable development
in those countries within the context of CAFTA-DR.
Part I of this article provides background on the foundations of free
trade and the context of CAFTA-DR, and it introduces concepts that are
integral to discussion of CAFTA-DR. Part II explores the environmental
and historical context of free trade agreements between the United States
and other Western Hemisphere countries. Part III explores CAFTA-DR’s
provisions as well as the positions of its opponents and supporters. Part IV
surveys the actual and potential effects of CAFTA-DR on Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Then, Parts
V and VI focus on Nicaragua’s needs and the prospects for Nicaragua to
develop in sustainable ways under CAFTA-DR. CAFTA-DR presents a
major threat to the poor in Nicaragua and other developing members
because it does not promote the three legs of the Triple Bottom Line.
30 This author traveled within Nicaragua in 2007 and interviewed businesspeople, govern-
ment officials, and labor organizers in Managua, San Juan de Oriente, Estelí, Ducuale
Grande, Nueva Vida, and San Juan de Limay.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 371–375.
32 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Nicaragua, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2010) (designating
Nicaragua “the poorest country in Central America”).
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Therefore, this article proposes that companies operating pursuant to
CAFTA-DR in its developing members be required to demonstrate their
meaningful pursuit of sustainable development by participating in the
Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), a global reporting mechanism that
measures efforts to pursue sustainability.33 Over 1,500 organizations
around the world are now submitting sustainability reports to the GRI,
and it has “become the de facto global standard for reporting.”34 The
closing sections of this article outline a plan of action for requiring use
of the GRI framework by U.S. companies operating in the CAFTA-DR
region, thereby encouraging those firms to conduct sustainable operations
in that region.
I. BACKGROUND: PREMISES OF FREE TRADE AND THE CONTEXT FOR
CAFTA-DR
This section provides background on CAFTA-DR. It begins by
exploring two premises on which CAFTA-DR is based. The first is the
assertion that CAFTA-DR promotes economic development for all through
comparative advantage. The second is the assumption that development
under CAFTA-DR is sustainable. It also introduces the concept of the
Triple Bottom Line, which is a tool for examination of whether actions by
business and government promote sustainable development. It ends with
a review of the framework on which NAFTA and CAFTA-DR are based.
A. Examining the Assumption That Free Trade Promotes
Comparative Advantage: What Is the Comparative Advantage?
Comparative advantage, an economic theory first presented by
David Ricardo in 1817, states that a country can always benefit from for-
eign trade so long as it finds its niche and relies on it.35 In The Principles
33 Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), What is GRI?, http://www.globalreporting.org/
AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/(last visited Mar. 7, 2010). The term “GRI” refers to both a frame-
work of international measurement standards and an organization. Throughout this
article the phrase “GRI Framework” refers to the international standards and “GRI
administration” refers to the organization itself.
34 Sino-Swedish Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) Cooperation, The Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI), http://csr2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/chtfa/200905/20090506246547.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
35 STEPHEN M. SURANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY ch. 40-0, http://
internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch40/T40-0.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
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of Political Economy and Taxation, Ricardo asserts that “what matters is
not the absolute cost of production, but rather the ratio between how easily
the two countries can produce the products.”36 This concept, known as com-
parative advantage, “states that it can be beneficial for two countries to
trade without barriers as long as one is more efficient at producing goods
or services needed by the other.”37 What is important, as Ricardo states,
is the “relative efficiency” of the production, not the absolute cost of pro-
duction.38 In the twenty-first century, many U.S. businesses are relying
on comparative advantage to justify their ventures in foreign countries.39
Free trade advocates assert that free trade agreements promote and create
a market in which each member contributes to the overall development of
the trade region. “The notion is that trade is based on natural comparative
advantages between trading partners. A country that has skilled workers
is going to do much better with products that require skilled labor than
some other country that does not have skilled workers.”40
B. Assertion That NAFTA and CAFTA-DR Promote Sustainable
Development
Proponents of free trade agreements say that the agreements bring
economic development that trickles down benefits to all, lifting all boats
through a rising tide of greater prosperity and development.41 They also
assert that the development is sustainable.42 Opponents of free trade
agreements assert that the development promoted through such agree-
ments is unsustainable.43
36 S. TAMER CAVUSGIL, GARY KNIGHT & JOHN R. RIESENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS:
STRATEGY, MANAGEMENT, AND THE NEW REALITIES 98 (2008).
37 Id.; see also SURANOVIC, supra note 35, ch. 40-0.
38 CAVUSGIL ET AL., supra note 36, at 98; see also SURANOVIC, supra note 35, ch. 40-0.
39 CAVUSGIL ET AL., supra note 36, at 109.
40 Becerra, supra note 6, at 321.
41 Paulette L. Stenzel, CAFTA: Its Origins and Its Provisions, GLOBALEDGE BUS. REV.,
Vol. 2, No. 2, 2008, at 1, 1, available at http://globaledge.msu.edu/newsAndViews/business
Reviews/gBR2-2.pdf.
42 Environmentalists focus on NAFTA’s and CAFTA-DR’s language, but businesspeople
do not: It has been pointed out that free trade agreements are “not designed to improve the
environment.” Alan Deardorff, Professor of Economics, Univ. of Mich., Panel Discussion on
Global Economics Sponsored by the Mission Marketplace, Chelsea, Michigan (May 18, 2008).
43 See, e.g., Rachel Anderson, CAFTA Is a Disaster: Vignettes from the Nicaraguan Country-
side and Marketplace, WITNESS FOR PEACE.ORG 1 (2008), available at http://www.witness
forpeace.org/downloads/W4P%20CAFTA%20report%20article.doc.
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Our Common Future, the 1987 report by the UN Brundtland
Commission, examined the possibility for “a new era of economic growth,
one that must be based on policies that sustain and expand the envi-
ronmental resource base.”44 The report emphasized the interconnec-
tedness of economic and environmental issues and that “many forms of
development erode the environmental resources upon which they must
be based, and environmental degradation can undermine economic develop-
ment.”45 In the aftermath of that report, businesspeople, environmentalists,
and government officials embraced the concept of sustainability whole-
heartedly.46 The term is used in many contexts. Managers speak of sus-
tainable development in connection with their business operations,47 and
governments include language about sustainable development in trade
agreements and treaties.48
In 1991, author Lester Brown said, “[t]he term sustainable develop-
ment is widely used throughout the world today, but few understand what
it means.”49 That observation is true over eighteen years later. For ex-
ample, Mark Langdale, former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, in a speech
supporting CAFTA-DR said, “[s]ustainable development is a popular buzz-
word these days: a big concept that lots of people latch onto. Everyone is
looking for a sustainable development model.”50 He continued, “[s]ustain-
able development is a big vessel into which everyone pours [his or her]
hopes and dreams. A sustainable development model is the Holy Grail of
economic development.”51
An articulation of the goal of sustainable development has become
standard in trade agreements between the United States and other coun-
tries of the Western Hemisphere. NAFTA set the model and mentions the
44 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 16, at 18.
45 Id. at 19.
46 For an introduction to OUR COMMON FUTURE, see supra text accompanying note 16. See
also EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 16–20 (discussing how OUR COMMON FUTURE provided
a foundation for the sustainability movement).
47 See, e.g., Michael Laff, Triple Bottom Line: Creating Corporate Social Responsibility
That Makes Sense, T+D (Feb. 2009), http://www.astd.org/TD/Archives/2009/Feb/Free/0902
_Triple_Bottom_Line.htm.
48 NAFTA, supra note 11, pmbl.
49 LESTER R. BROWN ET AL., SAVING THE PLANET: HOW TO SHAPE AN ENVIRONMENTALLY
SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL ECONOMY 12 (1991).
50 Mark Langdale, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, The Importance of Sustainable
Development, Address before the Costa Rican-American Chamber of Commerce Executive
Luncheon (Apr. 18, 2007).
51 Id.
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pursuit of sustainable development and environmental protection three
times in its Preamble.52 However, a distinction must be made between aspi-
rational words and mechanisms that give teeth to a goal. While NAFTA
includes the words, it does not require pursuit or attainment of sustain-
able development, and the Statement of Objectives within the body of
NAFTA does not mention the term.53 It does include an Environmental
Side Agreement called the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (“NAAEC”).54 However, NAAEC does not establish new
environmental law.55 In essence, it states that each country will enforce its
own environmental laws.56 Moreover, even if the environmental provisions
included meaningful mechanisms for the pursuit of environmental protec-
tion, that addresses only one leg of the Triple Bottom Line. Sustainable
development, as defined by the Triple Bottom Line, requires provisions for
social equity and economic interests of multiple stakeholders as well.57
Similarly, U.S. government representatives assert that CAFTA-DR
promotes sustainable development.58 In the spring of 2007, shortly before
Costa Rica signed CAFTA-DR, Ambassador Langdale stated that Costa
Rica’s policies, including a “Development Plan for the 21st Century,” pave
the way for Costa Rica to become the “first developed country in Latin
America by . . . 2021.”59 He said, “[t]hat plan is based on the assumption
that Costa Rica will be part of CAFTA[-DR].”60 Ambassador Langdale
continued,
The truth is that the key to the riddle of finding a
sustainable development model is right here in this room.
You all represent sustainable businesses (i.e., generate a
profit) that add value to your customers’ lives, treat your
employees well, and help provide for their families, and you
52 NAFTA, supra note 11, pmbl.
53 Id. art. 102.
54 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 8–14,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID
=567 [hereinafter NAAEC].
55 Id.
56 Id. For in-depth discussion of NAFTA’s environmental provisions, see Paulette L. Stenzel,
Can NAFTA’s Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable Development?, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 423 (1995).
57 See infra text accompanying notes 62–76 (discussing the Triple Bottom Line).
58 Langdale, supra note 50.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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all give time and invest in making Costa Rica a better place.
There is no better example of sustainable development than
the private sector that you all represent.61
While Langdale’s definition emphasizes that profits generated by busi-
ness add values to lives of customers and employees, his words refer only
to the economic leg of the Triple Bottom Line.
C. The Triple Bottom Line and Tools for Measuring Sustainable
Development
Sustainability is “not simply a matter of good corporate citizen-
ship” or a “matter of business ethics,” but rather a “fundamental principle
of smart management.”62 Businesses are talking about a philosophical shift
towards sustainable business practices, and thousands of companies are
“measuring and reporting their performance in the environmental, eco-
nomic, and social spheres.”63 In recent years, business managers, business
professors, and environmentalists have begun to label this pursuit the
“Triple Bottom Line.”64 This concept, coined by John Elkington,
challenges companies to look not merely at the economic or
profit aspect of their business but also at the environmental
and social costs:
At its narrowest, the term ‘[T]riple [B]ottom
[L]ine’ is used as a framework for measur-
ing and reporting corporate performance
against economic, social and environmental
parameters. At its broadest, the term is used
to capture the whole set of values, issues and
processes that companies must address in
order to minimize any harm resulting from
their activities and to create economic, social
and environmental value.65
61 Id.
62 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at xiv.
63 Id. For a discussion of these companies generally, see id.
64 Id.
65 EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 50.
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The Triple Bottom Line gives businesses a tool to help measure whether
their actions promote sustainable development. In this article, the terms
economy, social equity, and environment are used to identify the Triple
Bottom Line.66
Although businesspeople like to enumerate benefits of their efforts,
it is not possible to quantify all facets of the Triple Bottom Line. Never-
theless, businesses can use a variety of tools to analyze whether they are
addressing and balancing all three legs of the Triple Bottom Line. Those
tools include:
• Economic:
" Sales, profits, and return on investment (“ROI”),67
" Taxes paid,
" Monetary flows, and
" Jobs created.68
• Environmental:
" Air quality,
" Water quality,
" Energy used,
" Waste produced, and69
" Carbon footprint.70
• Equity (the social effects):
" Labor practices,
" Community impacts,
" Human rights, and
" Product responsibility.71
66 Another set of terms used to identify the concept is “people, planet, and profits.” Abby
Ellin, M.B.A.’s With Three Bottom Lines: People, Planet and Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/education/edlife/mba.html?_r=1. A third variation
is “economics, environment, and society” as used by the Dow Chemical Company. The Dow
Global Public Report 2003, http://www.socialfunds.com/csr/reports/Dow_Chemical_Global
_Public_Report_2003.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
67 ROI is a “measure of a corporation’s profitability, equal to a fiscal year’s income divided
by common stock and preferred stock equity plus long-term debt. ROI measures how effec-
tively the firm uses its capital to generate profit; the higher the ROI, the better.” Investor
Words.com, ROI Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/4316/ROI.html (last visited
Mar. 08, 2009).
68 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at xiii.
69 Id.
70 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Environmental Cost of Shipping Groceries Around the World, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/26/business/worldbusiness/26food
.html.
71 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at xiii.
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Of course, these measuring devices are an oversimplification. “Just as
meaningful financial reporting cannot be reduced to one number, so sus-
tainability does not sum precisely.”72
In the past, social, environmental, and economic pursuits were
addressed separately by corporations. For example, a business might en-
courage its employees to engage in volunteer work, but it was for a one-day
event.73 In today’s business world, companies that want to pursue sustain-
able development must integrate the social element into “an organization’s
daily functions so that it becomes more than just a one-time event.”74 A
“truly sustainable company would have no need to write checks to charity
or ‘give back’ to the local community, because the company’s daily opera-
tions wouldn’t deprive the community, but would enrich it.”75
The Triple Bottom Line “captures the essence of sustainability by
measuring the impact of an organization’s activities on the world.”76 Even
without precise measurement tools, it provides a meaningful way for
companies to evaluate their performances in the area of sustainability.77
The evaluation tools can facilitate discussion between businesses sup-
porting free trade and other citizens who are concerned about the effects
of free trade.78
Today, businesses are embracing the pursuit of sustainability, and
in recent years, the Triple Bottom Line has been adopted by a plethora of
businesses as a tool for measuring progress in that pursuit.79 The GRI
framework has “become the world’s leading benchmark for measuring,
monitoring, and reporting corporate sustainability efforts.”80 Figure 1
shows the increased numbers of organizations that have reported to the
GRI administration.
72 Id.
73 Laff, supra note 47.
74 Id.
75 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at 21.
76 Id. at xiii.
77 See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 50–51 (describing one company’s use of triple
bottom line measurements).
78 Compare Ana Isabel Eiras, Why America Needs to Support Free Trade, BACKGROUNDER
(Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), May 24, 2004, available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/upload/63821_1.pdf (supporting free trade), with La
Via Campesina, Stop Free Trade Agreements!, http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php
?option=com_content&view=article&id=825:india-mangalores-port-blocked-for-hours-no
-to-destructive-imports&catid=38:stop-free-trade-agreements&Itemid=61 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010) (documenting global struggles to prevent free trade).
79 EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 50. For discussion of the progression from environmentalism
to sustainability and development of the concept of the Triple Bottom Line, see id. at 11–27.
80 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at 211–12.
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Figure 1: Growth in GRI reporting 1999–2008.81
The organization’s “vision is that disclosure on economic, environ-
mental, and social performance become as commonplace as and comparable
to financial reporting, and as important to organizational success.”82 The
initiative is emerging as a leading model that is widely applauded both
for its Triple Bottom Line standards and reporting controls.83 According
to Marc Orlitzky, a professor of management at Penn State University,
“[i]f a company takes the [T]riple [B]ottom [L]ine seriously, then they [sic]
need a balanced scorecard with equal weight given to each category. . . . It
has to be judged for sustainability and not just recruiting purposes other-
wise it is set up for failure.”84 This comment reflects the holistic nature
of the Triple Bottom Line. The GRI framework encourages companies to
capture as much information in their sustainability reports as possible.85
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81 Statistics compiled by Matthew Shaw using data from 2008 GRI Reports List, http://
www.globalreporting.org/GRIReports/GRIReportsList/ (follow “GRI Reports List” hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
82 GRI, About GRI, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
83 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at 211–17.
84 Laff, supra note 47.
85 GRI, Completeness, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/
DefiningReportContent/LowerBlock/Completeness.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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The GRI administration does not rank a firm’s sustainability report
based on its social, economic, or environmental performance, but rather
evaluates it based on two sets of broad principles.86 The first set involves
four GRI principles that define the context of a report. They are: materi-
ality, stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability context, and completeness.87
Materiality refers to the report’s ability to describe the organization’s im-
pact on environmental, social, and economic factors.88 Stakeholder inclu-
siveness refers to a firm’s ability to list its stakeholders and detail how the
expectations and needs of each stakeholder are being met.89 Sustainability
context looks at elements of sustainability and identifies how the firm is
aiming to improve Triple Bottom Line elements in the future.90 Complete-
ness refers to covering the areas of boundary, scope, and time in such a
way that stakeholders are able to make a well-reasoned assessment of the
organization over a given period.91
Six additional GRI factors determine a report’s quality: clarity, reli-
ability, balance, comparability, accuracy, and timeliness.92 Clarity demands
that information be accessible and understandable to all stakeholders who
will use the report.93 Reliability refers to the processes used to prepare
a report; this includes gathering, recording, and analysis of data.94 A bal-
anced report takes into account both positive and negative perspectives
of a firm’s performance.95 In order to be comparable, information needs
86 GRI, G3 Online, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
87 These four phrases are key terms used internationally by the GRI. GRI, Defining Report
Content, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/DefiningReport
Content/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
88 GRI, Materiality, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/Defining
ReportContent/LowerBlock/Materiality.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
89 GRI, Stakeholder Inclusiveness, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/
G3Online/DefiningReportContent/LowerBlock/StakeHolderInclusiveness.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010).
90 GRI, Sustainability Context, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/
G3Online/DefiningReportContent/LowerBlock/SustainabilityContext.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010).
91 GRI, supra note 85.
92 GRI, Defining Report Quality, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/
G3Online/DefiningReportQuality/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
93 GRI, Clarity, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/Defining
ReportQuality/LowerBlock/DefiningReportQualityClarity.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
94 GRI, Reliability, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/Defining
ReportQuality/LowerBlock/DefiningReportContentReliability.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
95 GRI, Balance, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/Defining
ReportQuality/LowerBlock/Sustabinility+Context.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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to be reported consistently and in a way that allows a reader to track the
organization’s performance over a period of time.96 Accurate qualitative
information includes clarity,97 balance, and detail.98 Accurate quantitative
data can be judged on the methods used to analyze and gather data.99
Information needs to be disclosed in a timely manner to make it readily
accessible to stakeholders.100
Several other movements in the business world are congruent with
the GRI framework. The Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) move-
ment was developed in the 1990s, and many companies continue to speak
of it today. According to Savitz, CSR “emphasizes the benefits to social
groups outside the business, whereas sustainability gives equal impor-
tance to the benefits enjoyed by the corporation itself.”101
One organization that helps monitor environmental performance
is the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”). The ISO 9000
series standards are well-known metrics that measure a firm’s management
and quality control.102 The ISO 14000 series standards measure environ-
mental performance in a similar fashion.103 Additionally, the ISO is plan-
ning on developing the ISO 26000 series for social responsibility by 2010.104
96 GRI, Comparability, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/
DefiningReportQuality/LowerBlock/DefiningReportQualityComparability.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010).
97 Though clarity is a GRI standard for report quality, it is also used by the GRI as
a descriptor for accuracy. GRI, Accuracy, http://www.globalreporting.org/Reporting
Framework/G3Online/DefiningReportQuality/LowerBlock/DefiningReportQuality
Accuracy.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
98 The GRI recognizes that there can be accuracy in both qualitative and quantitative
information. The organization has developed detailed methods to determine accuracy of
both information types. These methods can be found online on the organization’s web
page. Id.
99 Id.
100 GRI, Timeliness, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/
DefiningReportQuality/LowerBlock/DefiningReportQualityTimeliness.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010).
101 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at xi–xii.
102 Id. at 76; International Organization for Standardization [ISO], ISO 9000 Essentials,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_9000_essentials (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
103 ISO, ISO 14000 Essentials, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_essentials (last visited
Mar. 8, 2010). For discussion of the ISO 14000-series, see Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the
ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards Provide a Viable Alternative
to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 237 (2000); see also David A. Wirth, The
International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as Swords
and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79 (2009).
104 ISO, Social Responsibility, http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/
3934883/3935096/home.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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ISO standards are relevant tools that a Triple Bottom Line-focused orga-
nization can utilize.105
The Dow Jones Sustainability Index is another metric for firms
to use to measure their Triple Bottom Line performances.106 The GRI
framework evaluates the quality of a company’s report in two ways.107
First, it examines a company’s monitoring processes.108 Second, it mea-
sures the data submitted by the company.109 In contrast, the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index directly measures a firm’s performance in the area
of sustainability.110 The Index also compares a firm against others in its
respective industry.111
Major firms including Shell, Telefónica Movistar Ecuador, and
Coca-Cola report to the GRI administration, and the number of smaller
firms joining them is growing rapidly.112 In 2009, Fort Collins Utilities
became the first municipal utility to submit a sustainability report with
the GRI administration.113 Fort Collins Utilities focuses on economic via-
bility, environmental factors, and social responsibility to align itself with
the GRI framework.114 In 2008, four universities around the world also
submitted their sustainability reports.115
The use of the GRI framework by such a diverse set of organiza-
tions demonstrates its versatility.116 Moreover, its use and acceptance by
multinational corporations and smaller organizations opens the door to its
use in the context of trade facilitated by free trade agreements such as
105 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at 76.
106 See David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The
Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 190
(2004).
107 See SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at 211–13.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 106, at 190 n.150.
111 See SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at 74–76.
112 The GRI itself is considered a small enterprise and submits its own sustainability
reports. GRI Reports List, supra note 81; GRI, Project News, http://www.globalreporting
.org/currentpriorities/supplychain/grigtzproject/projectnews (news from Jul. 10, 2007,
“Reporting Initiative Targets Small Suppliers”).
113 In Brief: City Joins Group for Sustainability, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, Mar. 7, 2009.
114 See fcgov.com, City of Fort Collins Utilities for the 21st Century, http://www.fcgov.com/
utilities/gri.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
115 They are Singapore Polytechnic (Singapore), Turku University of Applied Science
(Finland), the University of Birmingham (England), and the University of Southern
Queensland (Australia). GRI Reports List, supra note 81.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 112–115.
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CAFTA-DR.117 The following sections explore the provisions of CAFTA-DR
and the need for tools to ensure that development under that agreement
is sustainable.
II. CAFTA-DR’S PLACE IN U.S.-RELATED FREE TRADE IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
A. Free Trade Agreements: Context, Provisions, and Benefits
Expected
The pursuit of free trade through NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and other
free trade agreements is based on interrelated assumptions and practices.
First, it is assumed that a rising tide lifts all boats and that free trade
agreements, through comparative advantage, cause such rising tides.118
“So, the argument supporting the ‘race to the top’ theory is that ‘expanded
market access . . . offers the best hope for raising incomes and standards’
in poorer countries.”119 Thus, if benefits accrue to businesses in a developing
country (such as in Mexico under NAFTA or in Nicaragua under CAFTA-
DR), people throughout various sectors of each member’s economy will
benefit.120 As people earn more money, their earning power rises, and they
buy more goods and live more comfortable lives.121
This accompanies a second assumption: that comparative advan-
tage is good for all members of trade agreements and their citizens.122 For
example, in textiles, the comparative advantage for the developing mem-
bers is their cheap labor force.123 Under CAFTA-DR, Nicaragua is ex-
pected to take advantage of its comparative advantage in the areas of
textile manufacturing and coffee and pitaya production.124
117 Id.
118 Gene Sperling, How to Refloat These Boats, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2005, at B3.
119 Christian Brandt, Note, Laboring Toward Equality: NAFTA’s Effects and CAFTA’s
Wisdom, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 77, 89–90 (2005) (quoting DANIEL GRISWOLD &
DANIEL IKENSON, THE CASE FOR CAFTA: CONSOLIDATING CENTRAL AMERICA’S FREEDOM
REVOLUTION 11 (Cato Institute: Center for Trade Policy Studies 2004) available at http://
www.freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-021es.html.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 88–90 (noting that proponents of CAFTA believe that the U.S. and Central
America will both benefit from the agreement).
123 See Claudio Grossman, The Evolution of Free Trade in the Americas: NAFTA Case
Studies, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 687, 751–52 (1996).
124 See globalEDGE, Nicaragua: Economy, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countryInsights/
economy.asp?countryID=136&regionID=4 (last visited Mar. 8, 2010); CENTER FOR
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A third assumption is that the private sector is the best engine for
growth as compared to government-sponsored initiatives.125 In theory, the
mechanisms of free trade promote and create a free market, unrestricted
(or least minimally restricted) by government regulation.126 Developing
countries enter free trade agreements as a means of attracting foreign
investment.127 As an additional enticement to investors, countries often
privatize public services in conjunction with adoption of free trade agree-
ments.128 For example, a wave of privatization in Mexico prepared the way
for and accompanied NAFTA.129 CAFTA-DR’s developing members are
following a similar path as they privatize in areas such as health care,
financial institutions, telephone services, electricity, and water.130 To speed
up the privatization, developing countries often give substantial tax breaks
to investors.131
Proponents of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR assume that the agreements
will promote the free flow of goods and create a free market leading to
overall economic growth.132 The primary objective is to stimulate the entire
UNDERUTILISED CROPS, PAVUC FACT SHEET NO. 9 (University of Southampton 2007)
available at http://www.pavuc.soton.ac.uk/fruits/fruits_factsheets/Factsheet_9_pitahaya
_final_3006.pdf. Pitaya is a beautiful fruit with red or creamy flesh that grows in the
tropical climates of Central America. See College of Health and Human Sciences, Oregon
State University, Pithaya, Dragon Fruit, Pitaya, http://food.oregonstate.edu/glossary/p/
pithaya.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). There is irony in telling Nicaragua to grow pitaya
as its comparative advantage to turn around its economy when most people in the United
States have never heard of pitaya.
125 See Eisuke Suzuki, The Fallacy of Globalism and the Protection of National Economies,
26 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 319–20 (2001).
126 See Douglas A. Irwin, International Trade Agreements, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/
InternationalTradeAgreements.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
127 See Suzuki, supra note 125, at 321.
128 See Fernando Margáin & Walter Russell Mead, A Fast Track for Mexico, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2001, at 4–13.
129 Id.
130 See ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN, PROGRESS IN THE PRIVATIZATION
OF WATER-RELATED PUBLIC SERVICES: A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REVIEW FOR MEXICO,
CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN 1 (1998), available at http://www.eclac.org/
publicaciones/xml/5/4735/r1697_re.pdf; THE STOP CAFTA COALITION, DR-CAFTA YEAR
TWO: TRENDS & IMPACTS 44 (2007), available at http://www.share-elsalvador.org/programs/
advocacy/CAFTAYear2_monitoring_eng.pdf.
131 See ANDRES OPPENHEIMER, BORDERING ON CHAOS 83–110 (1998) (describing close ties
between government leaders and a select few wealthy leaders of private sector businesses
who were given favorable tax and regulatory treatment as they took over government-
owned businesses in the 1990s).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 118–131.
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economy through growth.133 This growth is measured by the gross domestic
product (“GDP”);134 free trade advocates assume that a free trade agree-
ment is a success when GDP rises.135 The problem is that GDP evaluates
only the economic leg of the Triple Bottom Line. Moreover, even when GDP
rises, that rise does not ensure that the economic lives of the majority of
people in that country are improved.136 For example, GDP does not dis-
tinguish between the $10,000 spent by a wealthy person on a diamond-
studded watch and the $10,000 spent by 100 people buying $100 worth
of rice and beans to feed their families.137 Thus, GDP is a faulty measure
of economic well-being across a society. In short, free trade agreements
rely primarily on the economic leg of the Triple Bottom Line, and that leg
is weak.
A free trade agreement sets rules for trade which can overrule local,
state, and national laws, and those rules focus on protecting the interests
of investors. Additionally, it creates its own enforcement mechanisms.138
133 Id.
134 See generally BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MEASURING THE
ECONOMY: A PRIMER ON GDP AND THE NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS (2007)
[hereinafter MEASURING THE ECONOMY] (describing the practice of calculating U.S. GDP).
GDP “measures the value of the goods and services produced by [an] economy in a given
time period.” Id. at 1.
135 The practice of using GDP, GDP per capita, or gross national product (“GNP”) as tools
to measure a country’s development has recently come under fire by noted economists.
Amartya Sen, a development economist at Harvard University and winner of the Nobel
Prize in Economics, asserts that GNP and GDP per capita are insufficient measures of
development because they fail to account for the quality of life of a country’s citizens.
Therefore, she asserts that they should not be relied upon to present a holistic picture of
development. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, 5–6, 14 (1999). Other economists,
including Colombia professor and former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz,
find GDP lacking in that it does not account for natural resource depletion. Justin Fox,
Don’t Ditch the GDP, TIME, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1729697,00.html.
136 SEN, supra note 135, at 5–6.
137 See MEASURING THE ECONOMY, supra note 134.
138 The United States makes a distinction between treaties and Congressional-Executive
Agreements. A treaty is approved by a 2/3 majority of the U.S. Senate and then sent to
the President for approval, while a Congressional-Executive Agreement is submitted to
both houses of Congress for approval by a simple majority and then sent to the President
for approval. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE 4–5 (2001), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/treaties
_senate_role.pdf. Although NAFTA and CAFTA-DR are called “agreements” in English
for purposes of the United States, they are called tratados (treaties) in Spanish (e.g.,
NAFTA for Mexico and CAFTA-DR for its developing members). See Imer B. Flores,
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NAFTA and CAFTA-DR reduce barriers to trade in many ways.
They deal with tariffs on goods including automobiles, agricultural prod-
ucts, textiles, and electronics.139 In theory, free trade agreements eliminate
tariffs on these goods.140 In practice, some are eliminated, others are phased
out over time, and still others are retained to protect sensitive goods.141
Also, the agreements address subsidies and price supports for specific prod-
ucts.142 They open domestic markets to competition in service areas in-
cluding advertising, entertainment, and information, as well as financial
and legal services.143 Telecommunications is another important area.144
Proponents of free trade agreements say the agreements bring
many benefits, including:
• Specialization boosts productivity, and countries can
import what they are not producing with funds from
exports. This argument is, essentially, a variation on
comparative advantage.145
• Free trade opens markets, leading to increased exports.146
• Consumers enjoy a greater variety of products and lower
prices.147
• Foreign investment stimulates growth.148
• Better jobs are created as export industries flourish.149
• Economic growth means higher standards of living for
all citizens.150
• Open markets lead to open governments.151
Reconstituting Constitutions—Institutions and Culture: The Mexican Constitution and
NAFTA: Human Rights Vis-à-Vis Commerce, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 693, 705 (2005).
139 USTR, NAFTA Partners Speed up Elimination of Tariffs on $25 Billion in Trade,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2002/january/nafta
-partners-speed-elimination-tariffs- (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
140 See Irwin, supra note 126.
141 Foreign Agricultural Service (“FAS”), NAFTA Agriculture Fact Sheet: Tariff Elimi-
nation, http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/policy/nafta/tariff.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
142 See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, art. 3.14.
143 See, e.g., id. ch. 12 (financial services) and ch. 15 (intellectual property).
144 See, e.g., id. ch. 13.
145 Irwin, supra note 126.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See Suzuki, supra note 125, at 319–20.
149 Eiras, supra note 78, at 3.
150 Brandt, supra note 119, at 89.
151 Export.gov, U.S. Free Trade Agreements, http://www.export.gov/fta/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2010).
676 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:653
These arguments will be applied to CAFTA-DR in the discussion below
using Nicaragua as an example.152
B. Faltering Plans for Integrated Trading Market in Western
Hemisphere
1. Global Context: Doha Talks Faltering
The global context for trade agreements provides further perspec-
tive. Since 2001, World Trade Organization (“WTO”) members have en-
gaged in on-again, off-again efforts to renegotiate GATT in what is known
as the “Doha Round” of negotiations.153 The talks collapsed on July 29,
2008.154 Hopes for a deal among the 153 WTO members must be tempered
with a great deal of patience.155 The New York Times reported that “[d]eep
skepticism about the advantages of free trade was on vivid display dur-
ing the Democratic primaries and it is growing in Europe, particularly
as France, Italy and other countries have fallen into an American-style
economic malaise.”156 This is a “massive blow to confidence in the global
economy” according to Peter Power, a spokesperson for the European
Commission.157 Moreover, economists fear that the people may be tempted
to turn to protectionism.158 There was not even mention of resuming Doha
talks until the G20 summit in London in April of 2009.159 After those talks,
Chen Deming, the Chinese Minister of Commerce, told the media that
Doha talks would resume at the G8 conference in July 2009.160
Thus, regional trade agreements may take on even greater impor-
tance in the near future. We need new ways of thinking. If countries around
152 See infra Parts V–VI and accompanying text (discussing effects of CAFTA-DR in
Nicaragua).
153 GATT, supra note 4; A Trade Deal in Doha, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, at A30.
154 Steven Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks Collapse on World Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A1.
155 For a list of current members of the WTO, see World Trade Organization, Members
and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010).
156 Castle & Landler, supra note 154.
157 Id.
158 Id. As the 2008–2009 recession deepens there are multiple instances of countries—
including, for example, the United States—turning to protectionist measures. Brussels
Warns US on Protectionism, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/
dw/article/0,,3988551,00.html.
159 See Daisy Ku, Doha Round to Resume in July, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2009, http://in.reuters
.com/article/businessNews/idINIndia-38859220090402.
160 Id.
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the world reject the GATT and NAFTA models, as appears to be happen-
ing,161 governments and businesses must find new ways to facilitate sus-
tainable trade. This article focuses on CAFTA-DR. Therefore, the next
subsection takes a closer look at NAFTA, the model for CAFTA-DR.
2. NAFTA Under Fire, Columbia and Panama Agreements on
Hold, and CAFTA-DR Meets Mixed Reviews
Since January 1, 1994, the date NAFTA took effect, the United
States has promoted its trade policy in the Western Hemisphere through
a series of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.162 The agreements
are designed to promote investment and development by reducing barriers
to trade.163 Proponents of the agreements assume that, when businesses
grow, benefits will trickle down to workers in developing countries.164 The
problem is that over a period of more than sixteen years NAFTA has not
fulfilled this expectation.165 The paradigm has evidenced major flaws.166
Therefore, it is inappropriate to continue to proceed with CAFTA-DR
without examining that paradigm.
When NAFTA took effect, the members announced plans to ex-
tend the model throughout the Western Hemisphere (with the exception
of Cuba).167 The Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”) would link
thirty-four countries from Canada all the way to Chile.168 Although it was
claimed that all thirty-four countries would quickly sign and by January
of 2005 it would be before the U.S. Congress for approval, plans stalled
nearly completely by May of that year.169 The FTAA is, if not dead, at least
on hold for the foreseeable future.170
Because plans for FTAA have failed to solidify, the United States
has been focusing on a variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements
161 See Castle & Landler, supra note 154.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 9, 11.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 139–144.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 118–131.
165 See Kevin Gallagher & Timothy Wise, Fixing Nafta’s Flaws, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Jan. 7,
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/jan/07/us-trade-nafta
-development.
166 Id.
167 John F. McManus, FTAA/CAFTA Opposition Rising, NEW AM., May 30, 2005, at 44.
168 Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”), Antecedents of the FTAA Process, http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/View_e.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
169 See McManus, supra note 167.
170 Simon Romero, Frustrated, U.S. Will Seek Bilateral Trade Pacts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2003, at C2; FTAA Stalls at Summit of the Americas, NEW AM., Nov. 28, 2005, at 6.
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that could build a framework for FTAA.171 The United States is working to
create free trade agreements with every country in the Western Hemi-
sphere, with the exception of Cuba.172 Mark Langdale, U.S. Ambassador
to Costa Rica, says,
free trade agreements are a cornerstone of U.S. foreign
policy in this region. We have negotiated FTAs with coun-
tries that represent 75% of the GDP of Latin America. We
are close to achieving an integrated trading market that
(except for Ecuador) runs along the entire 36,300 kilometer
Pacific coastline from the Canadian Arctic to Tierra del
Fuego in Chile.173
The United States is working persistently to increase its trade linkages
through a series of agreements with the countries of Latin America.
The United States has negotiated a series of bilateral free trade
agreements in its pursuit of an integrated Western Hemisphere trading
market.174 In recent years, the U.S. Congress has approved bilateral agree-
ments with Chile and Peru.175 The agreement with Chile, signed in 2003,
was the first free trade agreement signed and implemented between the
United States and a South American country.176 President Bush signed
the implementing law for the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement on
December 14, 2007, after it was easily approved by Congress.177 Since that
date, however, the tides have turned.
171 Romero, supra note 170.
172 Stenzel, supra note 41, at 1.
173 Langdale, supra note 50.
174 See Stenzel, supra note 41, at 1.
175 USTR, Chile Free Trade Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade
-agreements/chile-fta (last updated Apr. 24, 2010); USTR, Peru Trade Promotion Agree-
ment, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa (last updated
Feb. 18, 2010).
176 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final
-text; Chile and U.S. Sign Accord on Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, http://www
.nytimes.com/2003/06/07/business/chile-and-us-sign-accord-on-free-trade.html; see also
Heather Corbin, Note, The Proposed United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Reconciling
Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 14 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119 (2003).
177 United States- Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text.
President Bush signed the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement after it was easily
approved by the U.S. Congress. Steven R. Weisman, Senate Approves Peru Trade Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/business/05trade.html; Bush 
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More recently, the United States has negotiated free trade agree-
ments with Colombia and Panama.178 Both agreements are on hold.179 The
U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (“U.S.-Colombia FTA”) was negoti-
ated in 2006 under U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”).180 The agree-
ment with Colombia was expected to sail through Congress as did the
agreement with Peru. But in April 2008, observers were surprised when
the U.S. House of Representatives exercised its right to change its rules,
deciding to allow an unlimited number of days for consideration of the
agreement.181 In the wake of that decision, the agreement is simply on
hold within that body.182
Among the many reasons for opposition to that agreement is that
it will hurt peasants on small farms in Colombia.183 They will be forced out
Signs U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement, CHRON: BUSINESS, Dec. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/5379524.html.
178 Interview by Sean McCormack with Charles Shapiro, Senior Coordinator for the
Western Hemisphere Affairs Free Trade Task Force (May 8, 2008), available at http://link
.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1857622883?bctid=1782598627 (discussing U.S.-
Columbia free trade agreement).
179 Daniella Markheim, Pass Pending Trade Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and
South Korea in 2009, HERITAGE FOUND., Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/
tradeandeconomicfreedom/wm2167.cfm. Such agreements are also being negotiated with
countries in other areas of the world. They include one with South Korea and one with
Thailand. Id. The future of each is unclear. For example, talks related to a U.S.-Thailand
free trade agreement are stalled because people of Thailand believe the United States is
being unfair with its demands related to drug patents. See US-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement: MSF Calls on Thailand to Protect Access to Medicines in the Face of US
Pressure, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, Jan. 11, 2006, http://www.doctorswithoutborders
.org/press/release.cfm?id=1651.
180 USTR, United States and Peru Sign Trade Promotion Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2006/april/united-states-and-peru-sign-trade
-promotion (last updated Apr. 21, 2009). A TPA agreement can be approved or disapproved
by Congress, but Congress cannot amend it. Brett D. Schaefer, Congress Should Support
Extension of TPA, HERITAGE FOUND., Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/research/
tradeandeconomicfreedom/em965.cfm.
181 Teleconference led by Greg Delawie, U.S. Dep’t of State, and Charles Shapiro, Senior
Coordinator for the Western Hemisphere Affairs Free Trade Task Force (Apr. 24, 2008).
Participants included professors from various U.S. universities including this author.
182 Nicole Gaouette, Columbia Trade Pact on Hold, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/11/nation/na-uscolombia11.
183 Paulette L. Stenzel, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, GLOBALEDGE BUS.
REV., Vol. 2, No. 6, 2008, at 1, available at http://globaledge.msu.edu/resourcedesk/gbr/
gbr%202-6.pdf. Other serious concerns include violence and guerilla warfare throughout
Colombia. Daniel Griswold & Juan Carlos Hidalgo, A U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement:
Strengthening Democracy and Progress in Latin America, FREE TRADE BULL., Feb. 7, 2008,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ftb/FTB-032.pdf; see also Jack Epstein, Bad Business:
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of business because they cannot compete with cheap food imports from the
United States, which subsidizes its farmers.184 This has happened in other
developing countries that have entered trade agreements with the United
States. For example, low priced corn (subsidized by the U.S. government)
has forced many small Mexican farmers out of business since 1994 when
NAFTA took effect.185 It was expected that when the tariffs on corn were
fully eliminated in Mexico “there [would] be even more displaced or mar-
ginalized farmers.”186
As of 2010, debate centers on whether NAFTA should be amended
or abandoned,187 as well as on whether the U.S. Congress should ratify
the U.S.-Colombia FTA.188 When interviewed about the 2009 Summit of
the Americas,189 one commentator said,
[t]he biggest blow to trade thus far in 2009 has been the
fact that the global economic crisis has taken a huge bite
out of world flows of imports and exports, reducing them by
almost a third over the past year. Further, the Doha Round
of trade talks has stalled and America’s once vaunted deals
with Colombia, Panama and South Korea were stopped
dead as a Democrat-controlled U.S. Congress embraced
union-led “Just Say No” trade policies.190
In this climate, CAFTA-DR is also being questioned.
U.S. Trade Preference Should Not Be a Reward for Colombia’s Tolerating Political Violence,
LATIN TRADE, Oct. 2007, at 18; Rainbow Nelson, Dangerous Friends: Companies Feel the
Squeeze as U.S. Laws Clamp Down on Bribes Paid Abroad in the Name of Security, LATIN
TRADE, Aug. 2007, at 22 (discussing the connection between U.S. business and terrorism
in Colombia).
184 See A Level Playing Field for Poor Farmers, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST., Mar. 2003,
at 1, available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/if1_0.pdf.
185 Interview by Multinational Monitor with Anuradha Mittal, Losing the Farm: How
Corporate Globalization Pushes Millions off the Land and into Desperation, MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR, July–Aug. 2003, at 30, 30.
186 Calvin Terbeek, Note, Love in the Time of Free Trade: NAFTA’s Economic Effects Ten
Years Later, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 487, 505 (2004).
187 Stenzel, supra note 183; see also Roger Lowenstein, Tariff to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/magazine/15wwln-lede-t.html.
188 Stenzel, supra note 183. For discussion of the U.S.-Colombia FTA, see supra text
accompanying notes 178–185.
189 See Debbie Ransome, What the Summit Achieved, BBC CARIBBEAN, Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/04/090421_summitwrap.shtml.
190 David Rothkopf, Ahead of the Summit: The Hemisphere’s Incredible Shrinking Trade
Agenda, LATIN TRADE, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 12.
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Ratification of CAFTA-DR took nearly two years, and its effective
dates, by country, were:
• United States—January 1, 2006,
• El Salvador—March 1, 2006,
• Honduras—April 1, 2006,
• Nicaragua—April 1, 2006,
• Guatemala—July 1, 2006,
• Dominican Republic—March 1, 2007,
• Costa Rica—October 7, 2007.191
Debate leading up to the referendum in Costa Rica was heated. Those
voting against the agreement viewed it as lopsided, favoring U.S. inter-
ests.192 Proponents predicted that a defeat of the proposal would result
in a loss of jobs, a major decline in foreign investment, and an exodus of
well-educated Costa Rican citizens.193 Costa Rica’s President Óscar Arias
publicly predicted that it would be “collective suicide” if Costa Ricans did
not approve CAFTA-DR.194 Despite the President’s words, there was sub-
stantial opposition to it.195 One commentator observed, “the issue is class-
based: the rich favor [CAFTA-DR], while the poor invariably oppose it.”196
Costa Rican voters narrowly passed CAFTA-DR through a referendum
with only fifty-two percent favoring it.197 This was in spite of the fact that
191 GlobaLex, Francisco Avalos & Maureen Garmon, Basic Info and Online Sources for
NAFTA & CAFTA Research, Oct. 2006, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/NAFTA
_CAFTA_Research.htm; globalEDGE, Dominican Rep.: Economy, http://globaledge.msu
.edu/countryInsights/economy.asp?countryID=120&regionID=4 (last visited Mar. 9, 2010);
Costa Rica & CAFTA: What Next?, LATIN BUS. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2007, http://www.latin
businesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1697. Costa Rica was the last of CAFTA-DR’s
developing members to sign the agreement. Her citizens raised concerns related to “farm
trade, textiles, telecoms and insurance liberalization demands.” Jos’ Eduardo Mora, Trade:
Costa Rica Signs Treaty, Anti-CAFTA Unions Plan Protests, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 29,
2004, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/ips_costarica.pdf.
192 Cassidy Rush, Despite What President Arias Might Want You to Believe: Why Costa Rica
Might Not Need CAFTA After All, and Why It May Be a Bad Deal for the Average Costa
Rican, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF., Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.coha.org/despite-what
-president-arias-might-want-you-to-believe-why-costa-rica-might-not-need-cafta-after-all
-and-why-it-may-be-a-bad-deal-for-the-average-costa-rican/.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Marianela Jimenez, Costa Rica Leader: Trade Pact Passes, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/07/AR2007100700529.html.
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Costa Rica is one of the United States’ oldest trading partners in the
Central American region.
CAFTA-DR illustrates that the free trade model, as it has been
used by the United States since the 1990s, is not working. Therefore, this
article now turns to an examination of CAFTA-DR.
III. CAFTA-DR: THE BASICS
This section focuses on CAFTA-DR’s history and provisions. It also
surveys reasons why businesses and government leaders support specific
provisions of the agreement, and it examines reasons for opposition to
those provisions.
A. Who Supports CAFTA-DR and Why?
CAFTA-DR’s supporters assert that multiple benefits will accrue
to citizens of the developing members.198 They predict more jobs, increased
income for workers, and access to better and less expensive consumer
goods.199
In May 2004, then-United States Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick commented, “[CAFTA-DR] will do much to create the new eco-
nomic opportunity that will bolster the democratic commonwealth in the
hemisphere. It will eliminate tariffs, open markets, promote transparency
and establish state-of-the-art rules for 21st Century commerce.”200 U.S.
government leaders say citizens of all member countries will live better
at a later date if business is first permitted to grow and generate profits.201
Additionally, U.S. government officials argue that each member can par-
ticipate in regional markets by relying on its comparative advantage.202
U.S. business managers support CAFTA-DR because developing
members can supply labor that is even less expensive than labor in Mexico
while staying in relatively close proximity to the United States.203 Current
198 Eiras, supra note 78.
199 Id.
200 As quoted in GREG SPOTTS, CAFTA AND FREE TRADE: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD
KNOW 15 (2005).
201 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 14, at 665; see supra text accompanying notes 14–15,
35–40 (discussing comparative advantage).
202 See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 14, at 665.
203 See Erika Morphy, The Rocky Path to Regional Free Trade, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT MAG., Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/
1440/The_rocky_path_to_regional_free_trade.html.
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average minimum daily wages in maquiladoras in Mexico are about
$8.50.204 In contrast, current minimum daily wages in Nicaragua are about
$1.86.205 Thus, there is even greater incentive to move to Nicaragua and
CAFTA-DR’s other developing members. Without CAFTA-DR, its sup-
porters fear that U.S. companies that currently use completion factories
in Central America will relocate these factories to China or Southeast
Asia to take advantage of the lower cost of labor.206
In addition to profiting from lower labor costs under CAFTA-DR,
U.S.-based companies operating in developing members can ship goods
to the United States without paying stiff value-added taxes; most exports
from developing members enter the United States “basically tariff-free.”207
Thus, goods entering the United States are cheaper for U.S. consumers.
Supporters state that CAFTA-DR allows U.S.-based companies to continue
manufacturing product parts in Central America without being subjected
to high tariff rates.208
As compared to previous trade regulation, CAFTA-DR eliminates
quotas for many goods being imported and exported between the United
States and CAFTA-DR’s developing members.209 In some cases, such as
in the textile industry, quotas are still in place, but, as compared to pre-
CAFTA-DR, they allow greater quantities of specified goods to be traded
between the countries.210
Many government leaders and businesspeople of the developing
members share the perspectives of U.S. government and businesses. Marco
Vinicio Ruíz, Costa Rica’s Minister of Commerce, views CAFTA-DR as a
positive force for his country.211 He predicts that, in response to CAFTA-DR,
204 Mexico: Wages, Maquiladoras, NAFTA, MIGRATION NEWS, Feb. 1998, http://migration
.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1451_0_2_0. The term maquiladora is used in Mexico and
in most literature. In Nicaragua, many business people and government officials use the
term maquila. WITNESS FOR PEACE, BEHIND THE SEAMS: MAQUILAS AND DEVELOPMENT IN
NICARAGUA 4 (2000). For history and discussion of the maquiladora program, which origi-
nated between the United States and Mexico, see David W. Eaton, Transformation of the
Maquiladora Industry: The Driving Force Behind the Creation of a NAFTA Regional
Economy, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 747 (1997); Mexico: Wages, Maquiladoras, NAFTA,
supra 204.
205 McIntosh, supra note 28.
206 See Morphy, supra note 203.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Stenzel, supra note 41.
210 Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 517–533 (discussing the textile industry in
Nicaragua).
211 See Interview by Marison Rueda with Marco Vinicio Ruíz, Free Trader, LATIN TRADE,
Apr. 2007, at 18.
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Costa Rican exports of electronics, foods, and agriculturally-related prod-
ucts to the United States will grow.212 Costa Rica will take in about $1.50
billion in foreign direct investment from 2006 to 2010, which Ruiz says
is “70% of the total coming to Central America.”213 Moreover, business
leaders within the developing members look to Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”)
analysis of CAFTA-DR.214 S&P projects “considerable improvement for
the region’s growth.”215
B. CAFTA’s Provisions
CAFTA-DR’s primary purpose is to promote trade.216 It does so
through provisions designed to remove tariff barriers and non-tariff
barriers.217 Those non-tariff barriers include laws related to intellectual
property protection, financial services, and investment.218 It also covers
labor and environmental laws, at least in limited ways.219 This section
surveys CAFTA-DR’s provisions in those areas.
1. Textiles and Agricultural Goods
In the textiles arena, CAFTA-DR eliminates the United States’
quantitative import restrictions of textiles and clothing.220 CAFTA-DR
also includes a wide array of provisions that focus on agriculture.221 One
major provision is that countries must adhere to tariff rate quotas (“TRQs”)
described in the agreement.222 The agreement also states that participants
“share the objective of the multilateral elimination of export subsidies for
212 Id. Ruiz explains that the Central American region has trade agreements with eighty
percent of its trading partners and that Costa Rica is trying to become a member of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) organization to strengthen its relationship
with Asian countries. Id.
213 Id.
214 Morphy, supra note 203.
215 Id.
216 USTR, supra note 13; Stenzel, supra note 41.
217 SAMUEL MORLEY, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RES. INST., TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER CAFTA:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AGRICULTURE AND SMALL-
HOLDERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA 2 (2006), available at http://www.ruta.org/documentos_no
_indexados/CAFTA_marzo06/caftapaper3SamMorley.pdf.
218 Id.
219 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, chs. 16, 17.
220 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, art. 3.22.
221 Id. ch. 3, § F.
222 Id. art. 3.13.
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agricultural goods and shall work together toward an agreement in the
WTO to eliminate those subsidies and prevent their reintroduction in
any form.”223 This section also requires that an agricultural review com-
mission be formed.224
2. Trade in Services
CAFTA-DR covers a significant number of sectors of the economy
with variations accommodating needs of individual countries. The sectors
include financial services, telecommunications, tourism, computer services,
entertainment, energy, transportation, engineering, advertising, and envi-
ronmental services.225 In addition, CAFTA-DR includes provisions designed
to promote transparency in regulatory processes such as administrative
procedures for making rules and regulations.226 Transparency requires,
among other things, publication of those regulations.227 These rules are
expected to create a more desirable investment climate.228 Transparency
is good for all citizens in society, not just businesses. With information,
people can speak up in informed ways.229 While investment provisions
focus on economy, provisions for transparency contribute to social equity.
3. Investment Protection
Another set of CAFTA-DR provisions provides for reciprocal rights
for investors among members.230 Investors can establish and operate in-
vestments under the same conditions as local investors with some limited
exceptions.231 Subjects covered include business organizations, contracts,
223 Id. art. 3.14.
224 Id. art. 3.18.
225 Id. ch. 11; CARLOS FELIPE JARAMILLO & DANIEL LEDERMAN, CHALLENGES OF CAFTA:
MAXIMIZING THE BENEFITS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA 52–55 (2006).
226 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, ch. 18.
227 Id. art. 18.2.
228 For discussion of the need for transparency in developing members of CAFTA-DR,
particularly with respect to business transactions, see generally Omar E. García-Bolívar,
Dispute Resolution Process and Enforcing the Rule of Law: Is Arbitration a Viable
Alternative to Solving Disputes in Central America?, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 381 (2006).
229 For discussion of legislation designed to facilitate decision-making by citizens, see
generally Paulette L. Stenzel, Right to Act: Advancing the Common Interests of Labor
and Environmentalists, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1993); Paulette L. Stenzel, The Need for a
National Risk Assessment Communication Policy, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 381 (1987).
230 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, ch. 10.
231 Id. art. 10.3; JARAMILLO & LEDERMAN, supra note 225, at 56; see also Amy K.
Anderson, Note, Individual Rights and Investor Protections in a Trade Regime: NAFTA
and CAFTA, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1083–84 (2006).
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and debt instruments.232 It also guarantees fair market value if property
is expropriated.233 These provisions protect U.S. investors who wish to
enter markets in developing members.
4. Intellectual Property Rights
CAFTA-DR includes several types of provisions designed to protect
the intellectual property rights of investors. First, members promised to
ratify a number of other existing international agreements. Those agree-
ments relate to trademarks, patents, satellite television, and new plant
varieties.234 Second, members established standards related to such spe-
cific categories as internet domains, rights of authors, satellite signals,
and patents.235 This included an extension of the period of copyright pro-
tection from fifty to seventy years.236 Third, members addressed the need
for procedures and resources to enforce intellectual property rights.237
5. Labor Rights
Participating countries in CAFTA-DR must reaffirm their partici-
pation in the International Labour Organization (“ILO”).238 CAFTA-DR
recognizes the rights of individual countries to create and support domes-
tic labor standards, but also asks participants to uphold the most stringent
international labor standards.239 These internationally recognized stan-
dards include: the right of association, the right to collectively bargain,
prohibition of forced labor, elimination of the worst forms of child labor,
creation of a minimum age for workers, and provisions for “minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.”240
232 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, ch. 10.
233 Id. art. 10.7.
234 Id. ch. 15.
235 Id. arts. 15.4 (Internet domain names), 15.5, 15.6 (protections for authors), 15.8 (satellite
signals), and 15.9 (patents).
236 Id. art. 15.5; JARAMILLO & LEDERMAN, supra note 225, at 56–58.
237 JARAMILLO & LEDERMAN, supra note 225, at 56–58.
238 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, art. 16.1; see also International Labour Organization [ILO],
http://www.ilo.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). For discussion of CAFTA-DR and the ILO,
see generally Emily Miyamoto Faber, Note, Pregnancy Discrimination in Latin America:
The Exclusion of “Employment Discrimination” from the Definition of “Labor Laws” in the
Central American Free Trade Agreement, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 297 (2007).
239 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, art. 16.1.
240 Id. art. 16.8.
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6. Environmental Protection
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 17 deals with environmental protection.241
Article 17.1 states that each country has the right “to establish its own
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental develop-
ment policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its envi-
ronmental laws and policies” and shall “encourage high levels of environ-
mental protection, and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and
policies.”242 Countries agree to enforce their environmental laws, but they
are in violation of CAFTA-DR only if there has been a “sustained or re-
curring course of action or inaction.”243 Additionally, the chapter forbids
the governments from relaxing environmental laws and regulations to
encourage trade and investment.244
Article 17.5 establishes an Environmental Affairs Council that must
meet annually to oversee implementation of Chapter 17.245 It coordinates
its work with the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States-
Environmental Cooperation Agreement (“DR-CA-US-ECA”), established
separately.246 Pursuant to that agreement, “[t]he Parties agree to cooper-
ate to protect, improve and conserve the environment, including natural
resources. The objective of the Agreement is to establish a framework for
such cooperation among the Parties.”247
If a country fails to enforce its environmental laws and regulations,
the complaint process is long and involves many steps.248 And, if a coun-
try is found to have failed to enforce its laws and regulations, fines are
at a maximum of $15 million per year (a small amount as compared to
many companies’ operating expenses).249
C. Privatization Accompanying CAFTA-DR
“Privatization and market liberalization are widely considered to
be complementary reforms in transition economies. . . . [A]nalysis suggests
241 Id. ch. 17.
242 Id. art. 17.1.
243 Id. art. 17.2.
244 Id.
245 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, art. 17.5.
246 Agreement Among the Governments of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States of America on Environmental
Cooperation(“DR-CA-US-ECA”), Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/131456.pdf.
247 Id. art. II.
248 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, arts. 17.7–.11.
249 Id. art. 20.17.
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that when pursued too vigorously, privatization may actually impede the
transition process following market liberalization and reduce social wel-
fare.”250 As has been the case under NAFTA, a wave of privatization of
public services has accompanied CAFTA-DR. One major area is in the
production of electricity.
In many . . . Central American countries, privatiza-
tion of electricity production has already proven disastrous
in numerous ways. . . .This ranges from the privatization
of electricity generation, transmission, or distribution to
actually selling state-run generation facilities like dams to
private entities, thereby completely eliminating the govern-
ment’s role and responsibilities in the electricity sector.251
Privatization was expected to increase competition, but there is little
incentive for that because two companies control seventy to ninety
percent of private electricity production in the Central American coun-
tries.252 “[O]ne serious consequence of privatization that Costa Rica now
shares with other Central American countries is the devastating environ-
mental impact.”253 Hydroelectric power plants cause serious damage to
watersheds and the plant and animal life in them by making the river
inhospitable.254 Some dams divert water from miles of riverbeds, remov-
ing water supplies from plants, animals, and people that depend on
them.255 Moreover, the developers uproot and displace indigenous com-
munities living in the watershed areas.256
Thus, privatization of electricity production and building of hydro-
electric dams brings some economic benefit to companies that run them and
a social gain to people who gain access to electricity. But, it brings serious
harm to others on all three legs of the Triple Bottom Line: economy, social
equity, and environment.257 Speaking of the Plan Puebla Panama (“PPP”),
250 Rachael E. Goodhue, Gordon C. Rausser, & Leo K. Simon, Privatization, Market Liberali-
zation, and Learning in Transition Economies, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 724, 724 (1998).
251 R. Victoria Lindo, Note, Hydroelectric Power Production in Costa Rica and the Threat
of Environmental Disaster Through CAFTA, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 304 (2006).
252 Id.
253 Id. at 305.
254 Id. at 299.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 299.
257 For discussion arguing that Costa Rica must close loopholes in its environmental laws,
enforce those laws, and increase restrictions on privatization, see Lindo, supra note 251.
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an economic development plan that paved the way for CAFTA-DR, one
author says, “[i]nternational agreements like the PPP tend to share one
disturbing feature: the benefits of privatization are enjoyed almost entirely
by the international organizations, and those benefits come at a very high
cost to the citizens and the environments of these countries.”258
As illustrated through the discussion above of CAFTA-DR, its effects
reach into the economy, society, and environment of its developing mem-
bers. The next section of this article addresses the important accompany-
ing question: Do those effects support or thwart sustainable development?
IV. CAFTA-DR FAILS TO SUPPORT THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE IN
DEVELOPING MEMBERS
The following sections review some of the detriments that have
come to or are expected in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. Nicaragua will be discussed in greater depth
in the next section of this article. These sections show that CAFTA-DR fails
to support economy, social equity, and environment in sustainable ways.
They also reveal the interconnectedness of the three legs of the Triple
Bottom Line.259
A. Economy
This section gives examples of CAFTA-DR’s effects in several areas:
agricultural subsidies, textiles, and services. Opponents of CAFTA-DR
assert that it will result in a large loss of small, independently owned busi-
nesses within the developing members.260 It is estimated that 5.5 million
258 Id. at 299. For in-depth discussion of the PPP and its ramifications, see Stenzel, supra
note 10.
259 The examples below have been categorized under the headings economy, social equity,
and environment, but all are interconnected. The interconnectedness makes it difficult
to classify examples under one heading. This interconnectedness is at the heart of the
Triple Bottom Line. See infra Part IV.D.
260 See, e.g., Anuradha Mittal, CAFTA Will Hurt Family Farmers, Workers, & Small
Businesses, THE AGRIBUSINESS EXAMINER, Aug. 1, 2005, reprinted at Organic Consumers
Association, http://www.organicconsumers.org/Politics/cafta080105.cfm (last visited Mar. 9,
2010); Laura Carlsen, Memo Reveals Manipulation Scheme, COUNTERPUNCH, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.counterpunch.org/carlsen10042007.html (“[CAFTA opponents] emphasized
the impact on job loss in small and medium-sized industries”); The SHARE Foundation,
10 Reasons You Should Oppose CAFTA, available at http://www.share-elsalvador.org/cafta/
Flyer10-7.pdf (“Central American small-farmers will be devastated”).
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small farmers in Central America currently making their living from tra-
ditional agricultural methods will be quickly forced out of the market.261
This is because CAFTA-DR will eliminate import tariffs on those crops that
traditional agricultural methods emphasize: beans, corn, and rice.262 The
International Food Policy Research Institute estimates that CAFTA-DR
will result in a loss of $8.3 billion per year to developing members.263
Critics say that, when the final text of CAFTA-DR was reviewed,
“the Bush administration [had fallen to the pressure from U.S. business
and] heavily distorted CAFTA[-DR’s] sugar and textile provisions so as to
handicap Central America in precisely those sectors where it should have
benefitted the most.”264 For instance, CAFTA-DR imposes strict import
regulations on the sugar industry, and “after 15 years, Central America
will only get a market access quota representing 1.7 percent of total U.S.
production.”265 Moreover, a steep tariff will be imposed on any imports that
exceed the quota limit.266
Costa Ricans will be forced to compete with subsidized agricultural
goods. Most agricultural tariffs will be phased out in stages ranging from
immediate cancellations to a final phase-out at the end of twenty years.267
One report said, “the average tico [Costa Rican] farmer [will] have to com-
pete against Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland and other US multi-
nationals, which [will] undercut domestically produced foodstuffs in the
Costa Rican market.”268 CAFTA-DR’s sugar provisions are of particular
concern because they provide substantial protection for U.S. sugar pro-
ducers, despite the fact that sugar is one of the few industries in which
Costa Rica has a comparative advantage over the United States.269
261 Daniel P. Erikson, Central America’s Free Trade Gamble, WORLD POL’Y J., Winter
2004/2005, at 19, 25. For further discussion of the displacement of the rural sector, see
Brandt, supra note 119, at 97.
262 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, art. 3.3. This is ironic and disturbing in the wake of recent
shortages of rice and other staple food products in developing countries. See Keith
Bradsher, A Drought in Australia, a Global Shortage of Rice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/business/worldbusiness/17warm.html.
263 Erikson, supra note 261, at 25.
264 Id. at 26.
265 Id. at 21.
266 Id.
267 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, ch. 3, annex 3.3.
268 Rush, supra note 192.
269 Paulette L. Stenzel, Why CAFTA Faces Opposition from Citizens of Central America
and the Dominican Republic, 2 GLOBALEDGE BUS. REV., No. 3, at 1 (2008); see also Free
Trader, supra note 211 (“We were very careful with what the U.S. subsidizes, such as rice,
with tariffs that come with a 10-year phasing-out period, and dairy products and some
meats such as pork and chicken”).
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Honduras’ history contradicts the claim that reduction of tariffs on
agricultural products through CAFTA-DR will benefit developing members.
Honduras reduced tariffs in 1991 when it faced a severe rice shortage.270
Historians refer to the set of events as the arrozazo, or rice scandal.271
Prior to the 1991 tariff reduction, there were 25,000 rice
producers in Honduras, and the Honduran rice industry
employed 150,000 people, directly and indirectly. In an effort
to boost supplies after a 1991 drought, the Honduran gov-
ernment drastically reduced tariffs, and subsidized imported
rice immediately flooded the country.
As rice prices dropped, Honduran producers failed
to make payments on their loans and went bankrupt. In
spite of ten years of efforts by the Honduran government
to reverse the decline, the Honduran rice industry is now
just a shadow of its former self. By 2002, domestic rice pro-
duction was just 14% of the 1990 level, and there were less
than 2,000 rice producers left in the country.
Hondurans now must feed themselves with 95% im-
ported rice. A country that was once self-reliant in a staple
of the local diet is now exposed to the volatile international
markets for commodities and currency exchange. The simple
act of feeding the Honduran people now requires sending
precious hard currency out of the country and increasing
the Honduran trade deficit.272
Experience in Honduras shows that, by reducing tariff rates on staple prod-
ucts, CAFTA-DR hurts citizens of its developing members. According to a
2004 report by the relief agency Oxfam International, the Central American
region’s “rice industry [will] be decimated, jeopardizing 1.5 million jobs.”273
The job losses in the struggling farm sector could likely promote increased
migration of people to the United States.274 U.S. businesses are anxious to
gain market access in the areas of agriculture and manufactured goods.275
270 SPOTTS, supra note 200, at 50–51.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Marla Dickerson, Pact Seen as Threat to Latin Farmers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004,
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/16/business/fi-rice16.
274 See id.
275 See Export.gov, U.S.-CAFTA-DR Free Trade Agreement: How U.S. Companies Can
Benefit, http://www.export.gov/FTA/cafta-dr/index.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
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Citizens of developing countries are concerned, however, that their people
will receive little in return.276
The textile industry is closely tied to agriculture.277 CAFTA-DR im-
poses rules of origin on the textile and apparel industries—two significant
sectors of the economies of the developing members.278 To avoid tariffs, the
rules of origin require Central American exporters to produce goods with
regionally made components.279 Prior to CAFTA-DR, Central American
exporters used components from places outside the region, such as China
and Southeast Asia.280 However, CAFTA-DR’s rules essentially force ex-
porters located in its developing members to purchase their components
from U.S. suppliers, which charge higher prices.281 This policy benefits
U.S. businesses while impairing the developing members.282 Critics of
CAFTA-DR say the “purpose of forcing [the rules of origin] on the Central
Americans is to secure a customer base for U.S. textile products.”283
Unfortunately, the textile industries of the developing members
face additional, significant challenges in the world arena. January 1, 2005
marked the end of quotas on textile industrial goods by WTO members.284
In 2005, the WTO estimated that “China’s market share of U.S. imports
will leap from 11 to 18 percent in [direct] textiles, and from 16 to 50 per-
cent in clothing.”285 Accordingly, market shares for other countries will
decrease. The WTO estimates that “Mexico’s market share of U.S. imports
will drop from 10 to 3 percent, and the market share for the rest of the
276 See Citizens Trade Campaign, Opposition in Central America and the Dominican
Republic, http://www.citizenstrade.org/opposition_ca_dr.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2010)
(containing links to many articles and reports on the subject); Stenzel, supra note 269.
277 Many textiles are produced from cotton, a significant product in most of the developing
CAFTA-DR nations. Cotton production affects water use and is often accompanied by use
of pesticides made from petro-chemicals. Run-off contaminates water supplies, and chem-
icals on the fabric adversely affect the health of textile workers. For further discussion of
pollution in relation to the Indian textile industry, see Tamil Nadu, “Permanent Solution”
to Pollution Issue Needed, HINDU, July 6, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/07/06/stories/
2006070604390500.htm; see also Paul Schneider, The Cotton Brief, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/20/style/the-cotton-brief.html (discussing the use
of agricultural chemicals in cotton production).
278 Erikson, supra note 261, at 21.
279 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, ch. 4.
280 See Erikson, supra note 261, at 21.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id. (quoting GRISWOLD & IKENSON, supra note 119).
284 Id. at 24.
285 Id.
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Americas will shrink from 16 to 5 percent.”286 In a “ ‘post-quota’ world,”
Central American countries are facing a tough battle to maintain market
share.287 With the added free trade provisions in CAFTA-DR, the devel-
oping members may be facing their toughest battle yet to maintain their
already weak industries.
The provisions of CAFTA-DR that relate to agriculture and textiles
are leading to major hardships for developing members that are already
having a difficult time attracting investors and funding in all of these areas.
As a result, the main source of revenue in El Salvador is “capital from all
the shipments of money that Salvadorans send [to El Salvador] from the
United States” and “it is just money from Salvadorans living outside of the
country.”288 CAFTA-DR is going to set these countries back even further
on their quests to create sustainable economies.
B. Social Equity
“Adversaries worry that CAFTA[-DR] will undermine funda-
mental social rights of the people of Central America and the Dominican
Republic.”289 In fact, CAFTA-DR perpetuates and exacerbates social in-
equity in various areas. This section will focus on two sets of CAFTA-DR
provisions: intellectual property and labor rights. CAFTA-DR’s patent pro-
visions protect some economic interests and run counter to others. They
promote social inequity by hindering health care.290 The labor provisions
also fail to protect the needs of workers and their families.
The effects of CAFTA-DR’s intellectual property provisions in de-
veloping members may turn out to be devastating. Currently, it is esti-
mated that 300,000 people in the developing members are infected with
HIV/AIDS, of whom 35,000 require antiretroviral drugs.291 Unfortunately,
only around 6,000 individuals receive the required drugs.292 Prices are so
high that it is virtually impossible for individuals infected with HIV/AIDS
in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala to purchase a single dose of
286 Erikson, supra note 261, at 24.
287 Id.
288 An Invitation to Disaster: Corporate Power and Central America’s Environmental
Future Under CAFTA, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Apr. 2004, at 19, 21.
289 Brandt, supra note 119, at 94.
290 See Jill Replogle, Central American Trade Pact May Limit Access to Generics, 363
LANCET 1612, 1612 (2004).
291 Id. at 1613.
292 Id.
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the necessary medicine.293 In 2003, the price of a year’s supply of anti-
retroviral treatments was “only slightly less than the per capita annual
gross domestic income in Guatemala . . . and the Dominican Republic.”294
Enforcement of CAFTA-DR’s intellectual property provisions is
likely to contribute to increased deaths from HIV/AIDS in the Dominican
Republic and Guatemala. U.S. Representative Henry Waxman said
CAFTA-DR would block Costa Rican authorities from “approving the sale
of generic drugs for at least five years after a new [pharmaceutical drug]
is introduced . . . even if the drug’s patent has already expired.”295 “Without
access to generic medicines due to the strict provisions of CAFTA[-DR],
Costa Rica’s universal healthcare system is in jeopardy.”296
Generic equivalents to patented drugs could provide an alternative
for some people; however, CAFTA-DR’s provisions will eliminate nearly all
options for generic drugs to fight HIV/AIDS.297 As a result, CAFTA-DR will
shorten the lives of those who suffer from HIV/AIDS in the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, and other developing members. CAFTA-DR’s intellec-
tual property rights provisions “make access to generic medications nearly
impossible.”298 Through these provisions, questions arise surrounding the
availability of affordable health care to citizens of the developing members.
Guillermo Murillo, assistant director at Agua Buena, a human rights
organization in California, explained CAFTA-DR’s intellectual property
rights provisions as putting the “rights of patent owners . . . above human
rights.”299 Prior to CAFTA-DR’s adoption, generic drugs were inexpensive
in the developing countries.300 Now, critics argue that CAFTA-DR’s pro-
visions will essentially eliminate generic drug usage in the developing
members because, through CAFTA-DR, pharmaceutical companies can
control their patents for up to ten years.301 Murillo says the provisions of
CAFTA-DR “essentially grant pharmaceutical companies a monopoly on
new drugs registered in” developing members.302
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Rush, supra note 192.
296 Kate E. Kaiser, Note, The Fight for Access to AIDS Medications: How the Central
American Free Trade Agreement Conflicts with Costa Rica’s Constitutional Courts, 25
WIS. INT’L L.J. 535, 550 (2007).
297 See id.
298 Replogle, supra note 290, at 1612.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
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In short, the patent protections of CAFTA-DR support the economic
interests of pharmaceutical companies, but they are detrimental to the
public health, promoting social inequity.303 Also, treatment of HIV/AIDS
has significant economic ramifications for the developing members. Paul
Farmer, an infectious disease specialist, argues that treatment makes sense
from an economic standpoint.304 “There is an overwhelming need to prolong
millions of productive lives” in developing countries.305 When children are
orphaned and families collapse, there is a danger of economic collapse.306
The labor provisions of CAFTA-DR also fail to promote social equity.
Labor and human rights advocates have worked hard to be sure that these
rights are included in the agreements, but others oppose their inclusion.
Two of the main arguments against inclusion of labor rights are (1) that
they lower developing countries’ comparative advantage of lower wages,
and (2) they intrude on the sovereignty of developing countries.307 CAFTA-
DR’s labor provisions are incorporated in its text instead of in a separate
agreement as with NAFTA.308 However, they are less protective of workers.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”) in-
cluded an eleven-part definition of labor laws that included the “elimination
of employment discrimination,” while CAFTA-DR condensed the list to
a five-part definition and did not include “employment discrimination.”309
Some commentators asserted that “ ‘NAALC held potential to strengthen
labor.’ Unfortunately, the signatories have interpreted NAALC’s obligations
narrowly; and, as a result, many of the concerns expressed by workers have
been ignored.”310
303 For in-depth discussion, see Rahul Rajkumar, Note, The Central American Free Trade
Agreement: An End Run Around the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 15
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433 passim (2005).
304 Paul Farmer, M.D., Partners in Health, Infections and Inequalities: The Microbial
Burden of Poverty, Report Presented to the House Subcommittee on Biomedical Research
(Sept. 26, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.publicanthropology.org/TimesPast/
Farmer.htm).
305 Id.
306 Id. (noting that “it has been estimated that if it were not for malaria, Africa’s GDP would
have been $100 billion higher than it was last year. HIV has had an even more cataclysmic
impact,” and “[t]he war against the major infectious killers is also the war against poverty
and social inequalities”). For an in-depth discussion of the problem see PAUL FARMER,
INFECTIONS AND INEQUALITIES: THE MODERN PLAGUES (1999).
307 Faber, supra note 238, at 299.
308 CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, ch. 16; see also USTR, CAFTA-DR Accomplishes More for
Worker Rights than Trade Preference Programs, available at http://ustraderep.gov/assets/
Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file111_7787.pdf.
309 Faber, supra note 238, at 299.
310 Brandt, supra note 119, at 107.
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Costs of labor are an essential factor in business decisions, and
those costs can be reduced significantly by moving U.S. factories into
international territory. This action of a “profitable business . . . exploiting
international wage differences” is referred to as labor arbitrage.311 Jack
Welch, former CEO of General Electric, took a favorable view of the prac-
tice suggesting “that the ideal factory would be on a barge that would move
from country to country, taking advantage of the cheapest labor available
at any given time.”312 The use of labor arbitrage accelerated in the 1990s
and early twenty-first century.313
Business managers also consider the provisions of labor and health
and safety laws and the costs of compliance. CAFTA-DR includes a chapter
on labor that parallels its environmental chapter.314 It requires that mem-
bers enforce their own current domestic labor laws and regulations.315 Thus,
it does not provide an incentive for the developing members to increase the
level of protection they give to workers. To the contrary, the need to attract
investment provides an incentive for CAFTA-DR countries to maintain
the status quo. “CAFTA[-DR] actually reduces protections for workers’
rights that exist in current trade programs [in Central America] . . . where
workers are easily barred from union organizing, collective bargaining can
be avoided entirely, and strikes are routinely declared illegal.”316 Sadly,
there is strong evidence that the overall labor situation in CAFTA-DR’s
developing members is worse than in Mexico.317 Human Rights Watch
states that the labor laws of the developing CAFTA-DR members “do not
meet international standards, falling short in such areas as freedom of
association, protection against anti-union discrimination, and ensuring
311 SPOTTS, supra note 200, at 23.
312 Id. at 17. Welch’s successor Jeffery Immelt seems to be moving GE in a new direction.
Immelt understands that environmentally and socially beneficial practices can also be good
for business. It was under Immelt’s leadership that GE launched its new Ecomagination
initiative. GE Ecomagination, http://ge.ecomagination.com/index.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2010).
313 See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs [DESA], Working Paper: Globalization,
Offshoring and Economic Insecurity in Industrialized Countries, 22–26, U.N. Doc. ST/
ESA/2009/DWP/87 (Nov. 2009) (prepared by William Milberg & Deborah Winkler), available
at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2009/wp87_2009.pdf.
314 JARAMILLO & LEDERMAN, supra note 225, at 59–60.
315 Id.
316 Brandt, supra note 119, at 93–94.
317 For details and analysis of the approach to protections for workers in Mexico and two
CAFTA-DR members, see Laura Glass-Hess, Note, Ready or Not, Here Comes DR-CAFTA:
Comparing the Right of Association in Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador, 35 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 333 (2007).
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fair treatment of women.”318 While the International Labor Organization
argues that the laws of CAFTA-DR’s developing members may indeed meet
international standards, “there is little doubt that enforcement remains
problematic and that labor abuses are widespread.”319
Through free trade agreements, “multinational companies are mak-
ing a fortune [by] closing down their plants in the [United States] and mov-
ing production to countries where labor is cheap and government regulation
is nonexistent.”320 When NAFTA was passed, critic Ross Perot estimated
that by moving U.S. factories to Mexico, companies would save $10,000 per
job.321 Such moves allow companies to escape U.S. environmental, health,
and safety regulations.322 U.S. labor arbitrage is not just anecdotal; from
July 2000 to July 2003, three million U.S. manufacturing jobs were lost
through labor arbitrage, “and those jobs are never coming back.”323
Under NAFTA, Mexico’s economy is closely tied to the U.S. econ-
omy. “When trade between Mexico and the U.S. increased by volumes after
NAFTA was signed, wealth was created. However, this wealth did not find
its way to the Mexican workers who build the products for Mexico.”324 As
early as 2000, U.S. companies were closing down maquiladoras, many of
which were in the U.S.-Mexico border region, and moving to China.325 The
recession beginning in 2008 in the United States has had a devastating
impact on the Mexican economy, causing maquiladoras to reduce their
production, leaving Mexicans without work.326
318 Erikson, supra note 261, at 23.
319 Id.
320 SPOTTS, supra note 200, at 23.
321 On the Issues, Ross Perot on Jobs, http://www.issues2000.org/Celeb/Ross_Perot_Jobs
.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
322 AFL-CIO, Exploiting Both Sides—US/Mexico Free Trade, 2 SOC. CONT. 33, 35 (1991),
available at http://www.thesocialcontract.com/pdf/two-one/Afl-cio.pdf.
323 SPOTTS, supra note 200, at 23–24.
324 Becerra, supra note 6, at 323.
325 Ginger Thompson, Fallout of U.S. Recession Drifts South into Mexico; Jobs Are Scarce
and the Outlook Becomes Dismal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/12/26/business/fallout-us-recession-drifts-south-into-mexico-jobs-are-scarce-outlook
-becomes.html; see also Sidney Weintraub, Trade, Investment, and Economic Growth, in
NAFTA’S IMPACT ON NORTH AMERICA: THE FIRST DECADE 5 (Sidney Weintraub ed., 2004).
326 General Motors: Plant Shutdowns Will Pinch Juarez Maquilas, TRADINGMARKETS.COM,
Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock%20News/2289560/. The
slump began in 2001. “The year 2001 was without a doubt the blackest in the history of the
Maquiladora Industry, dating back to its origins in 1965.” Maquiladora Industry Outlook,
http://www.maquilaportal.com/public/artic/artic188e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). “Over
the course of the year . . . the number of operating maquiladoras [sic] plants fell from
3,703 to 3,450, a net loss of 253 plants—facilities that were closed permanently or at least
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Under CAFTA-DR, U.S. companies can locate factories in the
developing members to “take advantage of lower labor costs and a weak
regulatory environment that condones violations of labor rights.”327 Overall,
the labor provisions in CAFTA-DR fail to deal with the problems created
by labor arbitrage and abuses of labor law. CAFTA-DR calls for members
to enforce their own labor laws, but it does nothing to ensure that the
laws are enforced or that they meet international standards.328 While the
drafters of CAFTA-DR may have had good intentions, “good intentions are
no substitute for the enforceability of rules.”329 An analysis of NAALC in
Mexico and comparing the likely effects of CAFTA-DR concludes: “Without
strong enforcement of labor provisions, [CAFTA-DR] will only hasten the
‘race to the bottom’ in Latin America, with disastrous results for Central
American workers.”330
C. Environment
CAFTA-DR is also extremely weak in the environmental leg of the
Triple Bottom Line. In spite of the fact that the agreement acknowledges
the importance of environmental protection by including an environmental
section, it is not sufficient to support environmental sustainability.331
Although proponents of CAFTA-DR say that environmental protection
can be achieved, environmentalists fear a race to the bottom in terms of
environmental laws and their enforcement.332 “Due to the disparity of envi-
ronmental regulation between the United States and Central American
countries, CAFTA[-DR] presents countries with weak regulatory schemes,
like Honduras and Guatemala, as attractive locations for factories and
natural resource extraction.”333 “Even if strong enforcement language
temporarily.” Id.; see also Tim Higgins, Juarez Trade Officers Fear Economy, DET. FREE
PRESS, Apr. 19, 2009, http://www.freep.com/article/20090419/BUSINESS01/904190493/.
327 Erikson, supra note 261, at 21.
328 Id. at 24.
329 Id.
330 Glass-Hess, supra note 317, at 368. For additional comparison of NAALC to the labor
provisions of CAFTA-DR, see Kristi Schaeffer, Note, Mercosur and Labor Rights: The
Comparative Strengths of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in Developing and Enforcing
Labor Standards in Latin American States, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 851–54 (2007).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 241–249 (discussing CAFTA-DR’s environmental
provisions).
332 See Bradley N. Lewis, Comment, Biting Without Teeth: The Citizen Submission Process
and Environmental Protection, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1229–31 (2007).
333 Nathaniel Hemmerick Hunt, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Central
American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 545,
2010] FREE TRADE & SUSTAINABILITY: NICARAGUA 699
existed in Chapter Seventeen, the fact that only existing environmental
laws fall under the Agreement means that there is currently very little
to enforce.”334
CAFTA-DR’s developing members face major environmental chal-
lenges, and its opponents list environmental degradation as one of its
potential long-term consequences.335 This section gives examples from
two countries: El Salvador, one of those hard hit in terms of environmental
degradation, and Costa Rica, which is comparatively more active in envi-
ronmental protection.
CAFTA-DR’s developing members face serious environmental deg-
radation including deforestation, destruction of habitat, and destruction
of species.336 Between 1950 and 1990 the Central American region lost over
seventy percent of its forest cover.337 Deforestation is brought by activi-
ties including logging, mining, and agricultural production.338 Moreover,
citizens of the developing members must deal with polluted water, air pol-
lution, hazardous and non-hazardous waste, and more. A report by the
Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”) found that about seventy-five
percent of the people in Central America live with water pollution, scarce
water resources, land and housing shortages, emissions from industrial
facilities and vehicles, and congestion from vehicles.339 These problems,
in turn, reduce productivity of citizens, threaten public health, and lead
to increased violence.340
551 (2007). Hunt adds that these “[e]nvironmental concerns over the potential exploitation
of Central America’s natural resources partially stem from the consequences of free trade
under NAFTA,” where different environmental laws may have created “pollution havens”
in certain countries. Id.; see also Lewis, supra note 332, at 1241–45.
334 Benjamin W. Jenkins, Comment, The Next Generation of Chilling Uncertainty: Indirect
Expropriation under CAFTA and Its Potential Impact on Environmental Protection, 12
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269, 282 (2007).
335 Tony Silberfeld, Trading Green for Green, RISK MGMT. MAG., July 1, 2005, http://www
.rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Section=RMMagazine&NavMenuID=128&template=/
Magazine/DisplayMagazines.cfm&MGPreview=1&Volume=52&IssueID=242&AID=2816
&ShowArticle=1. Critics say the developing members are “going to pay a very high
[ecological] price.” An Invitation to Disaster, supra note 288, at 21; see also Jenkins, supra
note 334, at 281–83.
336 Hunt, supra note 333, at 550.
337 Id.
338 WILLIAM P. CUNNINGHAM & MARY ANN CUNNINGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCE: INQUIRY AND APPLICATIONS 128–29 (3d ed. 2005).
339 See Inter-American Development Bank [IDB], Facing the Challenges of Sustainable
Development: The IDB and the Environment: 1992–2002 7 (2002), available at http://www
.iadb.org/sds/doc/IDB_and_the_Environment.pdf.
340 Id.
700 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:653
CAFTA-DR’s environmental provisions hurt El Salvador, where
small farmers are pushed off their land because it is economically impos-
sible for them to produce their crops.341 These lands, previously main-
tained and protected by the small farmers, are destroyed; the trees are all
cut down and the land is divided into smaller sections and sold for develop-
mental purposes.342
Prior to CAFTA-DR, there was a three-kilometer zone on the coasts
of El Salvador that big fleets were prohibited from entering.343 That zone
has been removed.344 Big nets come with big fleets.345 The big nets not only
catch more shrimp, but they also catch species such as sea turtles that
the smaller fishermen do not catch.346 For every pound of shrimp caught
by the big fleets, twelve or thirteen pounds of other marine life are de-
stroyed.347 The law requires the big fleets to use special nets that permit
sea turtles to escape.348 However, more often than not, the big fleets do not
use the special nets; when fishers see the police, they merely pull up the
illegal nets.349
The root of the problem in El Salvador is that the government does
not enforce existing environmental laws: “environmental protection is being
relaxed more and more.”350 CAFTA-DR is likely to exacerbate this environ-
mental dilemma as “CAFTA[-DR] requires that international enterprises
be subjected to rules no more strict than those for national enterprise[s].”351
“[E]cologically [and environmentally, El Salvador is] going to pay a very
high price” when the full effects of CAFTA-DR are experienced.352
Costa Rica has been hailed as the leader in environmental pro-
tection laws in Central America353 and is a leader in eco-tourism in the
area.354 “The concept behind this rapidly growing industry is that the
profits generated by tourism can be used to sustain the local culture and
341 An Invitation to Disaster, supra note 288, at 21.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 An Invitation to Disaster, supra note 288, at 21.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 See Lindo, supra note 251, at 301.
354 See Jeremy Nisen & Richard Kaplan, “Sweet” Green Adventures in Costa Rica and
Panama, HISP. BUS., July–Aug. 2008, at 60.
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environment, and the vacation should incorporate an appreciation for
the local ecosystem.”355 Yet, Costa Rica continues to face environmental
challenges. For example, in the Osa Peninsula of southwest Costa Rica,
“deforestation continues to threaten the stability of the ecosystem.”356 Costa
Rica has “conflicting [environmental] laws . . . to guide corporations.”357
Moreover, CAFTA-DR threatens Costa Rica’s rights to protect its water-
ways because it facilitates harmful methods of hydroelectric production.358
This threatens the environment and social equity. “Hydroelectric dams
are also notorious for forcibly uprooting and displacing entire indigenous
surrounding communities around the world.”359 CAFTA-DR does not ad-
dress those concerns; two legs of the Triple Bottom Line are threatened.
D. Interconnectedness
Above, this article breaks down the Triple Bottom Line into its three
legs. In reality, however, harm to economy, social equity, and environment
are interrelated and inseparable. Indigenous people of the Western Hemi-
sphere recognize and honor this fact in their daily lives.360 The Maya be-
lieve that “[t]he roots of all living things are tied together. When a mighty
tree is felled, a star falls from the sky. Before you cut down a mahogany,
you should ask permission of the keeper of the forest and you should ask
permission of the keeper of the star.”361 In his book The Triple Bottom Line,
Savitz also stresses this interconnectedness.362
Authors Mark D. Belcher and James W. Newton speak of interna-
tional legal development in the context of CAFTA-DR saying, “the world
355 Id.
356 Lauren A. Hopkins, Note, Protecting Costa Rica’s Osa Peninsula: CAFTA’s Citizen
Submission Process and Beyond, 31 VT. L. REV. 381, 382 (2007).
357 Silberfeld, supra note 335.
358 See Lindo, supra note 251, in which the author presents an in-depth discussion of
CAFTA-DR’s environmental provisions with a focus on its threat both to Costa Rica’s
environment, as well as its ability to meet social needs.
359 Id. at 299.
360 See generally JAMES DAVID AUDLIN (DISTANT EAGLE), CIRCLE OF LIFE: TRADITIONAL
TEACHINGS OF NATIVE AMERICAN ELDERS (2006) (presenting traditional Native American
teachings on various subjects, from warfare to intangible notions such as reality and
awareness). The Triple Bottom Line is moving businesses toward recognition of this inter-
connectedness. “Management of social issues all the way up and down the supply chain
is one of the new challenges posed by the sustainability imperative in an interconnected
world.” SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21, at 49.
361 AUDLIN, supra note 360, at 117.
362 SAVITZ & WEBER, supra note 21.
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today is far more interconnected than ever before, and only continues to
be more so each day.”363 Businesspeople must recognize how this correlates
with each leg of the Triple Bottom Line. Environmental degradation affects
social equity. Economic policies protect the environment or lead to its deg-
radation. Economic policies lead to the creation or elimination of jobs and
affect social equity. Some business and government leaders ignore these
interrelationships and the resulting synergies, but others are demonstrat-
ing a new cognizance of these links as a result of their discussions about
the Triple Bottom Line. The next section of this article will highlight the
interconnectedness and interdependence of the three legs by discussing the
challenges Nicaragua faces under CAFTA-DR.
V. CAFTA-DR IN NICARAGUA—INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF THE LEGS
OF THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
CAFTA-DR affects many facets of life in Nicaragua. These various
facets are interrelated just as the three legs of the Triple Bottom Line are
interrelated. This section gives a brief introduction to Nicaragua’s turbulent
history and then looks at Nicaragua’s current social indicators and what
they reveal about sustainable development in Nicaragua. Next, it addresses
the following topics, all of which relate to the pursuit of sustainable devel-
opment in Nicaragua: wages, free trade zones, labor, textiles, agriculture,
and debt. All relate to the Triple Bottom Line. This section concludes that
CAFTA-DR fails to support the three legs of the Triple Bottom Line.
A. Nicaragua’s Turbulent History
Nicaragua has suffered from foreign intervention, wars, political
instability, crushing poverty, and natural disasters since the arrival of the
Spaniards over 500 years ago.364 More recently, it has also suffered major
environmental contamination resulting from industry, cattle-rearing, and
agricultural practices.365 CAFTA-DR is being brought into a country that
suffers seriously in all three legs of the Triple Bottom Line.
363 Mark D. Belcher & James W. Newton, International Legal Development: A Complex
Problem Deserving of a “Complex” Solution and Implications for the CAFTA Region, 12
SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 189, 212–13 (2006).
364 THOMAS WALKER, NICARAGUA: LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF THE EAGLE passim (4th ed.
2003).
365 Bill Gibson, The Environmental Consequences of Stagnation in Nicaragua, 24 WORLD
DEV. 325, 333–34 (1996).
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When the Spaniards arrived in Nicaragua in 1522, there were three
main indigenous groups: the Nicarao (between the Pacific coast and Lake
Nicaragua), the Chortega (along the Pacific coast, north of Lake Nicaragua),
and the Maribio (encompassed by Chortega territory on the Pacific coast).366
Other major indigenous groups of Nicaragua included the Sumu, Rama,
and Matagalpa.367 Shortly after setting up permanent settlements in the
region, the Spaniards began using the indigenous people as slaves on the
Spaniards’ estates and mines.368 Nicaragua remained a part of the Mexican
empire until 1821 when it became part of the United Provinces of Central
America.369 It became an independent republic in 1838, and assumed its
present day shape in 1894 when the Mosquito Coast on the Atlantic, also
known as Bluefields, was formally annexed by Nicaragua.370
During the twentieth century, the United States dominated
Nicaragua’s economy. The United States intervened militarily, in part
because of its interests in a proposed Nicaragua Canal.371 The United
States occupied Nicaragua for most of the period from 1912 to 1933.372
The United States left Nicaragua in 1933 in response to a revolt.373 Yet,
the United States continued its involvement in Nicaragua through its
support of Anastasio Somoza García, who was Nicaragua’s dictator until
he was assassinated in 1956.374 He was succeeded by his two sons, both of
whom had close ties to the United States.375
Since the late nineteenth century, Nicaragua has been dominated
economically by the United States, and Nicaraguans have suffered from
environmental degradation attendant to that domination. For example,
banned pesticides were used in agricultural development:
In the mid-1970s, Dow warned Dole of dangers associated
with human contact with the chemical [dibromo-chlor-
propane (“DBCP”)], and ended production, according to
366 LINDA A. NEWSON, INDIAN SURVIVAL IN COLONIAL NICARAGUA 27 fig. 4, 48–49 (1987).
367 Id. at 27 fig. 4.
368 WALKER, supra note 364, at 11–12.
369 JAIME BARQUERO, THIS IS NICARAGUA 16 (1988).
370 See Michael Gismondi & Jeremy Mouat, Merchants, Mining and Concessions on
Nicaragua’s Mosquito Coast: Reassessing the American Presence, 1893–1912, 34 J. LATIN
AM. STUD. 845, 849–52 (2002) (discussing the Nicaraguan annexation of the Mosquito
Coast, beginning in 1894).
371 WALKER, supra note 364, at 83.
372 Id. at 20.
373 LUCIANO BARACCO, NICARAGUA: THE IMAGINING OF A NATION: FROM NINETEENTH-
CENTURY LIBERALS TO TWENTIETH-CENTURY SANDINISTAS 40–46 (2005).
374 WALKER, supra note 364, at 26–28.
375 BARQUERO, supra note 369, at 20–21.
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testimony. But Dole, according to court papers, threatened
to sue if Dow did not honor an earlier production contract.
The firm then accepted about 500,000 gallons of the chem-
ical, including quantities that Dow had reclaimed from
other users, and sent much of it to banana plantations in
Central America.376
“Acute . . . exposure to DBCP in humans results in moderate depression of
the central nervous system . . . and pulmonary congestion from inhalation,
and gastrointestinal distress and pulmonary edema from oral exposure.”377
Activities related to the timber industry also caused economic deg-
radation. From 1945 to 1960, the U.S.-based Nicaraguan Long Leaf Pine
Company paid millions of dollars to the Somoza family.378 In return, it re-
ceived favors, which included waiving the requirement to reforest cleared
land.379 Nicaragua also became the largest beef supplier to the United
States in the 1970s.380 The ranching of cattle in Latin America has led to
deforestation and erosion of lands.381 To this day, Nicaraguans suffer from
the effects of those activities. The economic activities adversely affect envi-
ronment as well as social equity. Erosion of lands, deforestation, and illness
and death attendant to use of harmful pesticides affects social equity, too.
In December 1972, the Managua earthquake struck.382 Over 10,000
people were killed and hundreds of thousands were left homeless.383 In-
ternational relief was sent, but embezzlement by Somoza and members
of his National Guard prevented much of it from reaching the people of
Nicaragua.384
This set off international protests and was one of the triggers for
the civil war that began in 1979.385 The government was taken over by the
Frente Sandanista de Liberación (“FSLN”—Sandanista National Liberation
376 John Spano, Dole Must Pay Farmworkers $3.2 Million, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/p/2007/nov/06/local/me-dole6.
377 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1,2-Dibromo-3-Chloropropane (DBCP), http://
www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/dibromo-.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
378 Nica Land, The Somoza Dynasty (1936–1979), http://www.nicaland.com/samoza.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
379 Id.
380 Id.
381 Emilio F. Moran, Deforestation and Land Use in the Brazilian Amazon, 21 HUM.
ECOLOGY 1, 1 (1993).
382 WALKER, supra note 364, at 31.
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Id. at 34–40.
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Front).386 During the 1980s, however, the United States backed Samoza’s
National Guard, called the Contras, which had fled to Honduras.387 The
United States supported the Contras with arms and funding.388 The United
States also attacked Nicaragua’s ports and oil rigs and laid mines inside
her harbors.389
Between 1990 and 2006, the country was led in turn by the
National Opposition Union, the Liberal Alliance, and the Constitutional
Liberal Party.390 In 2006, however, leadership returned to the FSLN when
Daniel Ortega was elected.391
Meanwhile, Nicaragua has struggled with natural disasters. She
was hit hard by Hurricane Mitch in 1998392 and again by Hurricane Felix
(a category five hurricane on a scale of one to five, with five being the
strongest) in 2007.393
Overall, Nicaragua has suffered great hardships, many at the
hands of U.S.-based businesses and others at the hand of nature. She is
in the position of the weak sibling in her relationship with the United
States under the CAFTA-DR. It was in this environment that CAFTA-DR
was conceived and ratified.
B. Nicaragua’s Weak Legal System
A country needs a strong legal system to uphold its domestic laws
and international agreements such as CAFTA-DR, but Nicaragua’s legal
system is extremely weak and lacks legitimacy.394 International lawyer
Omar E. García-Bolívar says,
386 Id. at 39–40.
387 THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL: THE DECLASSIFIED HISTORY, 1–2 (Peter Kornbluh &
Malcolm Byrne eds., 1993).
388 Id. at 1.
389 Id. at 3.
390 HARRY E. VANDEN & GARY PREVOST, POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICA: THE POWER GAME,
544–45, 558 (2d ed. 2009).
391 James C. McKinley, Jr., Nicaraguans’ Votes Are In, and Ortega Is Back, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2006, at A10 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/08/world/americas/08nicaragua
.html?_r=1.
392 On September 28 and 29, 2007, the author of this article visited a village outside of San
Jan de Limay in the northern mountains of Nicaragua in the area called Río Abajo (the
River Below). All survivors of the village had been relocated from their homes, which were
totally destroyed by Hurricane Mitch.
393 Marc Lacey, Hurricane Felix Hammers Nicaragua and Honduras, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/05/world/americas/05felix.html?_r=1.
394 García-Bolívar, supra note 228, at 383–88.
706 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:653
[e]fficient processes, transparent decision-making pro-
cedures, experienced and well-trained judges, and court
officers, independent and impartial courts, and proper
physical infrastructures are all needed for an adequate
judicial system. Unfortunately, Central American judicial
systems lack many of these necessities.395
The U.S. Embassy in Managua describes Nicaragua saying, “[t]he legal
system is weak, cumbersome, and members of the judiciary, including
those at senior levels, are widely believed to be corrupt or subject to polit-
ical pressure. A commercial code and bankruptcy law exist, but both are
outdated.”396 The Embassy continues, “[e]nforcement of court orders is
frequently subject to nonjudicial considerations.”397 This lack of legiti-
macy is a major challenge in Nicaragua and CAFTA-DR’s other develop-
ing members.398
C. Nicaragua’s Infrastructure Needs
Nicaragua’s infrastructure is in miserable condition. Roads between
major cities are two-lane and most are in varying states of disrepair.399
This hinders economic development. People need potable water and sew-
age treatment, and the air carries dangerous pollutants.400 La Chureca
is the primary dump site for hazardous and non-hazardous waste on the
edge of Managua.401 Over 1,600 people live and work there, including at
least 500 children.402 People light fires to burn coatings from computer
395 Id. at 401.
396 Embassy of the United States, Managua, Nicaragua, Country Commercial Guide for
U.S. Companies, http://nicaragua.usembassy.gov/chapter6.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010);
see also García-Bolívar, supra note 228, at 385.
397 Embassy of the United States, supra note 396; see also García-Bolívar, supra note 228,
at 385.
398 “Guatemala’s reputation for corruption means that there is little public confidence in
state institutions, including most public agencies and the courts.” Louise D. Williams,
Out of the Gray: Building the Case and the Conditions for Enterprises to Join the Formal
Economy in Central America, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 329, 349 (2006).
399 See Vianica.com, Nicaragua, Transportation, http://www.vianica.com/nicaragua/4
-transportation.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
400 University: Managua Air Pollution Increases, BUS. NEWS AM., Apr. 6, 2000, http://
www.bnamericas.com/news/waterandwaste/University:_Managua_Air_Pollution_Increases.
401 See José Adán Silva, Nicaragua: Fighting over Society’s Scraps, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Mar. 20, 2008, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41676.
402 Id.; see also Manna Project International, Nicaragua, La Chureca, http://www.manna
project.org/nicaragua#chureca (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
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parts and electronic equipment to extract metals to sell for a few cents.403
Nicaragua’s waters are polluted, especially its two largest lakes: Lake
Managua (also known as Lago Xolotlán) and Lake Nicaragua.404 Lake
Managua is considered one of the most polluted lakes in the world, con-
taining pollutants such as mercury.405 This pollution hurts the environ-
ment and hurts local communities, thus thwarting the pursuit of social
equity. When communities suffer from chemical contamination and lack
waste management infrastructure, economic development and the envi-
ronment are harmed.
In 2005, less than seventy percent of Nicaraguans had access to
electricity.406 In Nicaragua, twenty-four hour electricity service is available
only to the wealthy, and Nicaraguans live with daily planned electrical
outages of approximately six to eight hours.407 This is a problem in homes
and restaurants because people cannot cook or run appliances and elec-
tric pumps cannot be operated to provide running water.408 It is also a
problem for small businesses because they cannot run the equipment,
403 Observed by the author of this article on Sept. 21, 2007 (photos on file with the author).
404 Nancy L. Pontius, United States Works to Reduce Water Pollution in Central America,
NEWS BLAZE, Nov. 14, 2008, http://newsblaze.com/story/20081114085031tsop.nb/topstory
.html; Kenny Bruno, Niagara to Nicaragua, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Jan.–Feb. 1992,
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1992/01/mm0192_05.html.
405 See Bruno, supra note 404. Elpesa, a Nicaraguan chlor-alkali plant, began operations
in 1968 and was finally ordered to close on January 7, 1992. It released significant amounts
of mercury into the lake and often released chlorine into the air. Id.
406 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY [IEA], WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006 571 (2006),
available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/weo2006.pdf.
407 This author experienced this during her stay in Nicaragua, seeing outages from 10:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m. each day in one neighborhood of Managua and from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
in another. In San Juan de Oriente there was no electricity from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
or later. Similar outages are experienced each day in San Juan de Limay. At the Holiday
Inn Managua the lights flickered each evening at 10:00 p.m. as the hotel shifted from a
public power supply to power from its own generator. These observations are based on
this author’s stay in Nicaragua September 20 through October 2, 2007. See also Invertia,
Unión Fenosa Informa de Apagones de Cuatro a Seis Horas Diàrias por Deficit (May 23,
2007), http://www.invertia.com/noticias/noticia.asp?idnoticia=1752414 (reporting four to
six hour power outages for all of Nicaragua during the week of May 23, 2007); see also
IDB, The Power Sector in: Nicaragua (1999), available at http://www.iadb.org/sds/IFM/
publication/publication_2885_2063_e.htm (click on hyperlink to “Nicaragua”) (reporting
increasing power system losses over the 1991 to 1995 period, from twenty-three percent
to just under thirty percent).
408 While this author was staying at a hotel in San Juan de Limay, cold beverages were not
available during the day. The managers did not want to open the refrigerator and lose
remaining cold air while waiting for electrical power to be restored. This was true in the
various places where she stopped for meals or beverages during her travel.
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such as sewing machines, that they need to manufacture their products.409
Maquiladoras serving large businesses, and hotels and restaurants serv-
ing tourists, purchase generators to produce their own electricity when the
public grid goes down.410 Small businesses, however, cannot afford to do
so.411 This is a severe impediment to economic development and is a strong
example of social inequity. CAFTA-DR purports to promote sustainabil-
ity, but it does not address problems with roads, waste management, and
electricity. In pursuit of sustainable development, these problems must
be addressed.
D. Nicaragua’s Debt & Pressures from the International Monetary
Fund (“IMF”)
Nicaragua’s economic problems have led to high levels of interna-
tional debt, and Nicaragua’s inability to pay that debt has led to borrowing
to pay the interest on loans.412 In 1994, Nicaragua received a $20 million
loan from the IMF and a $130 million loan from the World Bank in agree-
ment to pay $226 million in interest payments.413 Thus, Nicaragua has
even less money to fund social needs.
How did Nicaragua get into this predicament? The IMF makes
loans to developing countries, and it attaches specific budgetary conditions
to those loans, or “arrangements.”414 The loans are renegotiated every three
years with the borrowing country’s central government.415 These plans
are called Structural Adjustment Programs (“SAPs”).416 Because of the
conditions attached to the SAPs, the debt becomes a hook for the IMF to
409 Interview with four members of Colectivo Sancuajoche, San Juan de Oriente, Nicaragua
(Sept. 25, 2007). The group is a collective of women who make Fair Trade cotton clothing
such as blouses and dresses. A collective is similar to a cooperative and is a typical way
of doing business for Fair Trade businesses in Nicaragua.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 For discussion of Nicaragua’s debt, see Witness for Peace, Condemned to Debt: The
External Debt in Nicaragua, http://www.witnessforpeace.org/article.php?id=241 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010).
413 Happy New Year from the IMF, ENVÍO, Jan. 1994, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/1742.
414 International Monetary Fund [IMF], Factsheet: IMF Lending, Sept. 9, 2009, http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm.
415 Id.
416 John Briggs & Ian E. A. Yeboah, Structural Adjustment and the Contemporary sub-
Saharan African City, 33 AREA 18, 18 (2001); see also Anup Shah, Structural Adjustment—
A Major Cause of Poverty, GLOBAL ISSUES, (2010), http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/
structural-adjustment-a-major-cause-of-poverty.
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control a country’s internal decisions.417 The United States has tremendous
control over IMF decision-making. An IMF decision requires sixteen per-
cent of the available votes, and the United States holds a seventeen per-
cent interest.418 Thus, the United States has the ability to control IMF loans
and the conditions attached to them. Many people say that U.S. policy
equals IMF policy.419
The heavy debts of developing nations to the IMF and the condi-
tions attached to loans have led to public protests, including protests by
the developing members of CAFTA-DR.420 In response to protests against
their practices, the World Bank and IMF created the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (“HIPC”) Initiative in 1996.421 It was touted as “good news for
the poor.”422 The purpose of the HIPC Initiative is “to bring a country’s
debt burden to sustainable levels . . . in order to ensure that adjustment
and reform efforts are not put at risk.”423
Nicaragua joined the HIPC Initiative in 2000 with the promise that
up to seventy percent of its debt would be forgiven.424 In 2004, full appli-
cation of HIPC Initiative relief began.425 However, it was not the relief that
Nicaraguans anticipated. New loans were extended to Nicaragua with con-
ditions that paralleled those attached to earlier loans.426 More structural
adjustments were required as conditions for Nicaragua’s HIPC status.427
417 See Briggs & Yeboah, supra note 416, at 1.
418 Benoît Chervalier, The Reform of the IMF: The Tree Which Hides the Forest, GERMAN
MARSHALL FUND OF THE U.S., May 9, 2006, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm
?id=203.
419 See, e.g., Arthur MacEwan, Economic Debacle in Argentina: The IMF Strikes Again, AM.
PROGRAM, Jan. 2, 2002, http://americas.irc-online.org/commentary/2002/body_0201argentina
.html.
420 10,000 Protest IMF in Ecuador, DEMOCRACY NOW, Feb. 12, 2001, http://www.democracy
now.org/2001/2/12/10_000_protest_imf_in_ecuador. For discussion of protests related to
the effects of trade agreements in Central America, see Stenzel, supra note 10, at 599.
421 IMF, Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”)
Initiative, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm.
422 Media Briefing, Oxfam Int’l, Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction: Failing to Deliver,
Apr. 2000, http://oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/debt_aid/downloads/debt_povred_failing
.rtf (quoting Jim Wolfensohn, president, World Bank in 1996).
423 PAUL S. ZEITZ, A REVIEW OF EXPERIENCES IN INTEGRATING AN EXPANDED HIV/AIDS
RESPONSE TO THE DEBT RELIEF PROCESS IN AFRICA: 1999–2000 7 (2000), available at
http://aidsalliance.3cdn.net/09765b704b40622f4c_sfm6vwk4e.pdf.
424 Press Release, IMF, IMF and World Bank Support $4.5 Billion in Debt Service Relief
for Nicaragua, Jan. 23, 2004, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/pr0411.htm.
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Id.
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Moreover, funds are being used to pay Nicaragua’s internal debt of
$1.5 billion instead of being used to meet social needs such as education,
health care, and infrastructure improvements.428 The IMF has said that
internal debt payment is urgently needed to ensure a healthy debt mar-
ket.429 In the midst of this, it is alleged that funds have been misused. For
example, there were land confiscation payoffs with widespread accusations
of fraud.430 High interest bonds were issued for bank bailouts.431 The alle-
gations were investigated for corruption, and the bonds were declared
illegal by the program’s comptroller.432
Additional steps to relieve Nicaragua’s debt came in 2006 with the
G8 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (“G8”).433 The G8 financed a complete
cancellation of IMF and World Bank loans for nineteen countries, including
Nicaragua, but there were contingencies attached to the plan.434 To get
cancellation, the debtor must be a HIPC with prior SAPs.435 Nicaragua
qualified under the plan in 2004, and received cancellation of close to
eighty percent of its foreign debt.436 This came at a significant cost. Witness
for Peace reports,
[a]t its culmination, the HIPC initiative will reduce Nicara-
gua’s debt by $3.5 billion dollars. Under HIPC Nicaragua’s
debt and debt payments will be made more “sustainable”—
in other words, the IMF and World Bank will keep receiving
428 See USAID, Nicaragua, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/ni.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010).
429 E.g., Hemant Shah et al., Public Debt Markets in Central America, Panama, and the
Dominican Republic, 130–32 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/07/147, 2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07147.pdf. See generally S. M. Ali Abbas
& Jakob E. Christensen, The Role of Domestic Debt Markets in Economic Growth: An
Empirical Investigation for Low-income Countries and Emerging Markets (IMF, Working
Paper No. WP/07/127, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/
wp07127.pdf (using data from 1975 to 2004 from ninety-three low-income countries and
emerging markets, the study analyzes the market behavior of domestic debt at different
levels and debt’s positive and negative effects on the economies at large).
430 See Rikke J. Broegaard, Land Tenure Insecurity and Inequality in Nicaragua, 36 DEV.
& CHANGE 845, 858 (2005).
431 See Karla Jacobs, CENIs Scandal: The Biggest Fraud in Nicaraguan History, TORTILLA
CON SAL, June 25, 2009, http://www.tortillaconsal.com/cenis.html.
432 Id.
433 World Bank, Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative MDRI: Fact Sheet, http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/mdri_eng.pdf.
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation [NORAD], Nicaragua, available at http://
www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=119237.
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their payments on time. To complete the HIPC initiative,
Nicaragua will undergo another series of stringent Struc-
tural Adjustment policies, including the completion of the
privatization of state enterprises such as electricity, water,
and telephone service.437
Writing about Nicaragua and other coffee producing countries,
Fair Trade expert Dean Cycon says,
[e]ven during the best of times, farm communities have
rarely been able to make meaningful improvements in the
basics of water supply, education, health care, and housing.
Not only does the coffee crop not generate enough money,
but the World Bank, the IMF, and the international lending
community have greatly inhibited the ability of national
governments to assist farming communities by forcing them
to slash rural health care and environmental and educa-
tional budgets under “structural adjustment” policies.438
When the IMF promised a new $100 million loan to Nicaragua, it was with
the stipulation that Nicaragua cap public salaries in line with inflation.439
This came at a terrible time for Nicaragua’s health care system; it was
during a debilitating doctors’ strike in Nicaragua, with doctors demanding
higher salaries.440 To put this in perspective, currently, “[f]or every $1
spent on health care, Nicaragua spends $5 on debt service payments.”441
Thus, Nicaragua was, and is, being forced to cut down on health care, a
major component of social equity.
Her duty to pay international debt hurts Nicaragua’s ability to pro-
vide other social services, too. “To balance the budget, Nicaragua has to
reduce social spending on services such as health, education, and environ-
mental protection.”442 Thus, the SAPs and HIPC Initiative hurt Nicaragua
437 Witness for Peace, supra note 412.
438 DEAN CYCON, JAVATREKKER: DISPATCHES FROM THE WORLD OF FAIR TRADE COFFEE
xi–xii (2007).
439 Ben Beachy, Swindling the Sick: The IMF Debt Relief Sham, COMMONDREAMS.ORG,
Jan. 27, 2006, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0127-32.htm.
440 Id.
441 Witness for Peace, supra note 412.
442 Id.; see also Michael J. Pisani, The Negative Impact of Structural Adjustment on Sectoral
Earnings in Nicaragua, 35 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 107 (2003) (concluding that structural
adjustment policies in the 1990s caused workers to suffer a decline in wages with the brunt
of the harm falling on women and workers in the informal sector).
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with respect to all three legs of the Triple Bottom Line. This is relevant
because it coincides with the CAFTA-DR era in Nicaragua.
E. Nicaragua’s Social Indicators
The Nicaraguan people have desperate needs in all legs of the
Triple Bottom Line, but especially in the area of social equity. Most of her
people lack basic employment, education, and health care.443 In addition,
access to such services as electricity and clean water can be limited.444
Most of Nicaragua’s people are unemployed or underemployed.445
Officially, 3.8% of economically active Nicaraguans are unemployed, but
that figure does not include 900,000 unpaid homemakers.446 Moreover,
official figures fail to count many people who are on the margins of society,
so the actual unemployment totals are inevitably higher.447 Unofficially,
Nicaragua has an underemployment rate of 46.5%.448 And those who
are employed often do not earn enough to support their families.449 The
Nicaraguan government sets a minimum wage for each sector of its econ-
omy.450 A recent study revealed that in every sector the monthly mini-
mum wage was below $174 (3,000 córdobas)—the monthly amount the
Nicaraguan government estimates is needed by an urban family for a basic
basket of goods.451
Nicaragua’s poverty and unemployment result from and perpetuate
extremely low levels of education.452 Even though schools are free, parents
443 See UNICEF, At a Glance: Nicaragua, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nicaragua
.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). According to data from 2005, 48.3% of Nicaraguans live
below the poverty line, and 17% live in extreme poverty; 40% of the population have no
access to health services; approximately 24% of children are not in the school system. Id.
444 See supra text accompanying notes 406–09 (discussing a lack of electricity).
445 globalEDGE, Nicaragua: Economy, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/nicaragua/
economy/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
446 CBS News World, Country Fast Facts: Nicaragua, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/
09/19/country_facts/main3277489.shtml (click on “Economy” tab) (last visited Mar. 12, 2010)
(data as of 2006).
447 See globalEDGE, supra note 445.
448 CBS News World, supra note 446.
449 Id. Nicaragua has the third-lowest per capita income in the Western Hemisphere, and
the distribution of that income is “one of the most unequal on the globe.” Id.
450 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: NICARAGUA § 6(e) (2006), http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61734.htm.
451 Id.
452 See International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD], Rural Poverty in
Nicaragua, http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/nicaragua
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cannot afford the books and uniforms required for school attendance.453
Therefore, they cannot afford to support their children through primary
and secondary school, much less a university education. As a consequence,
“[i]t takes an average of 10.3 years to complete the mandatory six years of
schooling, and only 29 [percent] of children complete primary schooling.”454
Not surprisingly, one-third of the population over fifteen years of age is
illiterate.455 People with little education earn little.456
Medical care is also inadequate. “The number of doctors per 10,000
Nicaraguans has decreased from 6 to 3.8 since 1996.”457 One out of six
Nicaraguans lacks access to basic medicines.458 The situation appears to
be improving, at least slightly, since 2006 under the administration of
President Ortega.459 One city-level government official reported that citi-
zens who lack funds for basic medicines now can obtain them when they
visit public health centers.460
Nutrition is also a major problem in Nicaragua. Twenty-two percent
of the population is undernourished.461 About twenty percent of children
(last visited Mar. 12, 2010) (noting that poverty in Nicaragua occurs mostly in rural areas,
where access to education and other public services is limited).
453 Interview with Ms. Yamileth Pérez, Director General, Barrio Acahualinca (neighbor-
hood level director for the Acahualinca neighborhood of Managua) and Directora de
Medio Ambiente, Distrito II (Director of Environment, District II) for the city of Estelí,
Nicaragua (Sept. 28, 2008).
454 United Nations Girls’ Education Initiative [UNGEI], Nicaragua: Background, http://
www.ungei.org/infobycountry/nicaragua.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
455 Danna Harman, Ortega Hoping for a Second Act in Nicaragua, USA TODAY, Oct. 6,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-06-ortega_x.htm.
456 See World Bank, Republic of Nicaragua: Poverty Assessment, at i–iii, Report No.
14038-NI (June 1, 1995), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContent
Server/WDSP/IB/1995/06/01/000009265_3961019105405/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf;
see also World Bank, Nicaragua: Poverty Assessment, http://www.worldbank.org/ (search
for “Poverty Analysis—Nicaragua: Poverty Assessment”) (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). “Poor
households also have less education than the nonpoor, another key factor explaining low
earnings capacity.” Id.
457 Witness for Peace, Nicaragua at a Glance, http://www.witnessforpeace.org/article.php
?id=239 (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
458 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Infrastructure Support, http://www.bms.com/foundation/reducing
_health_disparities/donations/Pages/infrastructure.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2010) (noting
that nearly 800,000 Nicaraguans have no access to healthcare).
459 See James M. Roberts, Nicaragua’s President Ortega: The Balancing Act after One
Year, BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 11, 2008, at 6, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/
latinamerica/upload/bg_2097.pdf (noting that Ortega’s budget for 2008 increased funding
for health care).
460 Interview with Yamileth Pérez, supra note 453.
461 STATISTICS DIV., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAO], NICARAGUA:
MONITORING PROGRESS TOWARDS HUNGER REDUCTION TARGETS OF THE WORLD FOOD
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younger than five years of age suffer from chronic malnutrition resulting
in a delay of growth.462
All of these problems prompt Nicaraguans to seek work in other
countries.463 They simply see no alternatives if they want to survive.464
Nicaraguans remaining in their country rely heavily on income from for-
eign remittances.465 The number of Nicaraguan migrants in Costa Rica
increased by 393% from the 1980s to 2000 (45,885 to 226,374).466 There are
an estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 Nicaraguan migrants in Costa Rica
and 500,000 in the United States, including seasonal and undocumented
migrants.467 In 2004, remittances to Nicaragua represented 17.8% of GDP—
the highest percentage among all Central American countries.468 This
shows Nicaragua’s serious need for jobs. CAFTA-DR can create employ-
ment, but it is essential that this development be sustainable.
F. Free Trade Zones, Wages, and Labor under CAFTA-DR
1. Free Trade Zones
Nicaragua is attractive to foreign investors because of its rela-
tive proximity to the United States, its ready (although poorly educated)
SUMMIT (WFS) AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDG) (2008), http://www.fao
.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/food_security_statistics/monitoring_progress_by
_country_2003-2005/Nicaragua_e.pdf.
462 Programa Especial para la Seguridad Alimentaria Centroamérica [PESA—Special
Program for Food Security in Central America], Organización de las Naciones Unidas para
la Agricultura y la Alimentación [Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations], Indicadores
de Seguridad Alimentaria Nutricional en Centroamérica [Statistics of Nutrition and Food
Security in Central America], http://www.pesacentroamerica.org/pesa_ca/indicadores.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
463 See José Luis Rocha, Why Do They Go? Theories on the Migration Trend, ENVÍO, July
2003, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2105 (noting that Nicaragua’s “shortages, features
and mechanisms converge to make [it] such a major league expeller of migrants that [it]
validate[s] almost any model” of migration).
464 See id. “Desperation is a variable seldom considered. Hunger produces despairing people.
More than refugees and political asylum seekers, Nicaraguan politics produces [sic] des-
perate utopian refugees. Very few people are prepared to put their money on Nicaragua
and some have even declared it unviable.” Id.
465 See id. (noting that, in some municipalities, remittances constitute sixty percent of
monthly family income).
466 Id.
467 Witness for Peace, supra note 457.
468 Dovelyn Agunias, Remittance Trends in Central America, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE,
Apr. 2006, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=393.
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workforce, and its lack of taxes on exports.469 Among the fifty companies
operating in Nicaragua’s free trade zones (industrial parks), almost all are
from the United States, Taiwan, or South Korea.470 Nearly 45,000 people
are employed in twelve free trade zones, and, among the employees, eighty
percent are women and fifty-six percent are single mothers.471
The largest free trade zone in Nicaragua is Las Mercedes in
Managua.472 In December 2007, Nicaragua’s free trade zone had 120 com-
panies, directly employed 85,750 people, and exported $1,243,000 worth of
goods.473 A serious global economic downturn is reducing these numbers.474
For example, on March 3, 2009, it was announced that the Korean-based
textile maquiladora, Yu Jin, is closing and will leave 500 workers unem-
ployed.475 This follows the closure of Cone Denim, a U.S.-based textile firm
that announced a fourteen-month shutdown earlier in 2009.476 That shut
down, leaving 800 unemployed, has also been attributed to the global eco-
nomic downturn.477 This provides evidence that neither U.S. nor other
foreign-based businesses can be expected to bring a meaningful influx of
jobs to Nicaragua’s free trade zones in the foreseeable future.
Critics of free trade say that it promotes a race to the bottom for
wages, labor standards, and environmental protection.478 Many of the
469 See Lauren Russell, Textile Industry Teeters: On the Eve of an International Trade
Deadline, an Industry Struggles to Survive, FLA. FLYINS, 2004, http://www.international
journalism.com/TextileIndustry.html (discussing factors affecting foreign investment in
Nicaragua’s textile industry).
470 Found. for Sustainable Dev., Human Rights Issues in Nicaragua, http://fsdinternational
.org/ntlopps/country/nicaragua/humanrights (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
471 See id. (“[Eighty percent] of all FTZ workers are women, of whom . . . 70% are single
mothers”).
472 UK Trade & Investment, Nicaragua: Background and Geography, https://www
.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ukti/appmanager/ukti/countries?_nfls=false&_nfpb=true&
_pageLabel=CountryType1&navigationPageId=/nicaragua (click on “Background and
Geography” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
473 GUSTAVO BERMÚDEZ, ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNATIONAL DEL TRABAJO, NICARAGUA:
COMISIÓN TRIPARTITA DE ZONAS FRANCAS: DIÁLOGO SOCIAL FRENTE A LA CRISIS 2 cuadro 1
(2009).
474 See generally Peter S. Goodman & Floyd Norris, No Quick Fix to Downturn, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2008, at A1 (discussing economic downturn).
475 Posting of Rafael Lara to El Nuevo Diario, 500 Trabajadores Irán al Desempleo por
Cierre de Empresa Coreana, http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/44611/ (Mar. 4,
2009, 13:04).
476 Id.
477 Id.
478 See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Labor Standards, Development, and CAFTA, INT’L ECON.
POL’Y BRIEFS (Inst. for Int’l Econ. & Ctr. for Global Dev., Washington, DC), Mar. 2004,
at 1, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb04-2.pdf (noting that some argue
716 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:653
zones, including Las Mercedes, are state-owned,479 and the state provides
huge tax incentives to businesses that establish facilities in them.480
Owners of maquiladoras pay virtually no taxes. For example, they are
100% exempt from income, municipal, property, capital gains, and sales
tax.481 They are also 100% exempt from taxes on the importation of raw
materials, equipment, machinery, and spare parts.482
This refutes the assertion that CAFTA-DR will bring Nicaragua
monies to meet its needs for infrastructure and social programs. Nicaragua
gives up tax monies it desperately needs because it must compete so hard
to bring businesses to its free trade zones. With low wages and few or no
tax dollars coming in from the maquiladoras, the rising tide is an illusion.
2. Low Wages and Few Restrictions through Labor Laws
Something is better than nothing, but the “something” brought
to employees working in Managua’s free trade zone is very little indeed.
Nicaragua’s government sets a minimum monthly wage for each em-
ployment sector, but none of the employment sectors meet the amount
that Nicaragua’s government estimates is needed for a family of four to
buy basic goods each month.483 These low wages are a significant entice-
ment for companies considering locating a production facility in the coun-
try.484 Emilio C. Noguera Cáceres, Asesor Laboral for Managua’s free
trade zone, acknowledges that he would like to offer higher paying jobs
to his fellow Nicaraguans, but he has to face realities.485 The low-wage
that “failure to include labor standards in trade agreements increases inequality and
leads to a race to the bottom for workers worldwide”).
479 UK Trade & Investment, supra note 472.
480 See Comisión Nacional de Zonas Francas [Nicaragua], Incentives, http://www.cnzf.gob
.ni/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=28%3Aincentivos&lang=en (last
visited Mar. 13, 2010) (listing tax incentives).
481 Id.
482 Id.
483 For discussion, see Brandie Ballard Wade, CAFTA-DR Labor Provisions: Why They
Fail Workers and Provide Dangerous Precedent for the FTAA, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 645,
666 (2007). Using 2004 figures, Wade lists $141 as the estimated amount needed for basic
goods in a month for a family of four. A more recent source lists $155 as the amount for
2005. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, supra note 450, § 6(e); see
also supra text accompanying notes 450–451.
484 See Elliott, supra note 478, at 4. “Developing countries usually have abundant labor
and therefore a comparative advantage in low-wage, labor-intensive activities.” Id.
485 Interview with Emilio C. Noguera Cáceres and visit to the Las Mercedes free trade
zone, Managua, Nicaragua (Sept. 24, 2007). Asesor Laboral translates as “labor consultant,”
see THE OXFORD SPANISH DICTIONARY 67, 445 (1994) (translating asesor as “consultant” and
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jobs are the best he and his colleagues can bring to their country at the
present.486
Low wages alone do not bring in new businesses; managers also
consider a country’s labor climate. On paper, Nicaragua’s laws appear to
be highly protective of employees. The Labor Code requires acceptable
working conditions with respect to minimum wages, work hours, and occu-
pational safety and health standards.487 Workers have the right to collec-
tively organize, bargain, and strike.488 Yet, employers in Nicaragua are
notorious for behavior that violates those laws.489 The government lacks
money and motivation for enforcement of laws and regulations that would
protect workers.490 Even if it had funding, the government would likely
hesitate to enforce those laws strictly because of the dire need for jobs.
For example, Nicaragua’s labor code calls for an eight-hour work
day and forty-eight-hour work week.491 Yet, factory managers in Nicaragua
confirm that the standard work day is longer.492 The law states that over-
time is voluntary493 and that workers must be paid double time for it.494
In practice, forced overtime has been common, at least prior to the cur-
rent U.S. and worldwide recession; some workers report working up to
laboral as “labor”), but it is an important position. The Asesor Laboral is the Nicaraguan
government’s representative to the country’s Corporación de Zonas Francas (free trade
zones).
486 Interview with Noguera Cáceres, supra note 485.
487 For a directory of Nicaragua’s labor standards, see ILO, Nicaragua, http://www.ilo
.org/dyn/natlex/country_profiles.basic?p_lang=en&p_country=NIC (click on “Basic Laws”
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
488 The Labor Code: Workers’ Rights vs. Economic Recovery?, ENVÍO, Sept. 1992, http://
www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2546 (discussing a proposed expansion of workers’ rights).
489 Interview with Gladys Manzares, a union leader who has worked in numerous maquilas
in Managua’s zona franca (free trade zone), in Managua, Nicaragua (Sept. 25, 2007).
490 See Elliott, supra note 478, at 5. “[P]overty, lack of resources, and weak governmental
capacity are not the only reasons why developing countries do not effectively enforce
labor standards. Some also lack the political will to do so. . . .” Id.
491 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, NICARAGUA: A COUNTRY STUDY
ch. 3 (Tim Merrill ed., 1994), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/nitoc.html (follow
“Labor: Employment Conditions” hyperlink). The forty-eight hours are achieved through
a six-day work week. Id.
492 During this author’s visit to a factory on September 24, 2007, she took photos of a sign
in Formosa Textil, a major textile factory, which notifies employees that they must work
from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, and 8:30 a.m. to noon each Saturday.
493 See Wade, supra note 483, at 665 (noting that the Nicaraguan Constitution prohibits
forced labor).
494 ALVARADO Y ASOCIADOS, GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA 2010 38 (2010),
available at http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/GuidesToDoingBusiness/
Guide_Nicaragua.pdf.
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twenty-four-hour shifts, and payment is not the double time required by
law.495 Managers at Las Mercedes say that time-and-a-half is standard.496
In other locations, workers complain of forced overtime without pay.497
They also complain of poor working conditions and of being told if and when
they may use the restroom.498 Pregnant women are guaranteed three
months paid maternity leave, and the law says employers are not allowed
to release women because of pregnancy.499 In one maquiladora, however,
“several pregnant women complained that management would not allow
them to visit the doctor for medical appointments during work hours.”500
Sometimes miscarriages happen in the factory because of strenuous work-
ing conditions.501 Additionally, pregnant women are fired, and maternity
leave is often denied.502 These issues are particularly important in the
context of CAFTA-DR.
Nicaragua’s employers are required to pay into the national Social
Security fund for their employees.503 In practice, some companies take
deductions from employees’ paychecks but do not pay the deductions into
Social Security.504 Additionally, the law requires paid sick leave.505 In prac-
tice, many employers simply disobey the law.506 Similarly, occupational
safety and health laws guarantee workers the right to safe and sanitary
495 Interview with Manzares, supra note 489.
496 Interview with Noguera Cáceres, supra note 485.
497 Wade, supra note 483, at 666.
498 Id.
499 The Labor Code, supra note 488 (discussing a bill providing that the three-month period
for maternity leave be made obligatory and that employers must transfer pregnant women
engaging in hazardous work to less hazardous positions without any salary loss).
500 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, supra note 450, § 6(e).
501 See Liza Featherstone, The Student Movement Comes of Age, THE NATION, Oct. 16, 2000,
at 23, 26 (describing a factory in the Mil Colores free trade zone where “women routinely
have miscarriages in the bathroom”).
502 In Mexico, for comparison, “[o]nce a woman is hired and becomes pregnant, ‘maquiladora
managers sometime[s] attempt to reassign women to more physically difficult work or
demand overtime work in an effort to force the pregnant woman worker to resign.’ ”
Emily Miyamoto Faber, Pregnancy Discrimination in Latin America: The Exclusion of
“Employment Discrimination” from the Definition of “Labor Laws” in the Central American
Free Trade Agreement, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 297, 306 (2007) (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, NO GUARANTEES: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN MEXICO’S MAQUILADORA SECTOR (1996),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Mexi0896.htm).
503 Campaign for Labor Rights, Fighting for Our Rights in Managua, http://www.clrlabor
.org/alerts/2005/nov07-milcolores.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
504 See id.
505 Experience Nicaragua, Labor, http://library.thinkquest.org/17749/labor.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2010).
506 See Campaign for Labor Rights, supra note 503.
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conditions.507 Yet, there are many reports by Nicaraguan workers of
dangerous practices such as a lack of hygiene in workplaces and forced
unpaid overtime.508
The National Labor Committee is a coalition of groups that works
to defend the rights of workers throughout the world.509 It has prepared at
least twenty-eight reports documenting labor problems in Nicaragua.510
For example, a 2003 report on KB Manufacturing, located in Granada,
Nicaragua, documented numerous problems, including the following:
• 10.5- to 14-hour work days with up to 70 hours per week
expected of individual workers;
• Pressure to produce at shocking rates: “Corporate time
motion study breaks the 150 operations necessary for
sewing a J.C. Penney or Sears blazer into time frames
of 1/100th of a second, while assigning piece rates as
low as 6/100ths of a cent”;511
• Workers shortchanged on their pay;
• Repeated threats to move work to China;
• Mandatory pregnancy tests for all new female employees
and harassment of pregnant women;
• Lint and dust in the air as well as high levels of noise
and inadequate lighting;
• And many other abuses.512
Union leaders have little to no power in Nicaragua.513 And the
government, even if it would like to support union leaders, cannot afford
507 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, supra note 450, § 6(e).
508 Id.
509 Nat’l Labor Comm., Mission Statement, http://www.nlcnet.org/about (last visited
Mar. 13, 2010). It serves as an information center, drawing from a database including
over 22,000 individuals and organizations. Id. Members include labor, women, students,
and civil rights, religious, and grassroots groups. Id. For details and links to copies of over
100 reports, see Nat’l Labor Comm., Newsroom, http://www.nlcnet.org/newsroom (last
visited Mar. 13, 2010).
510 Nat’l Labor Comm., Search Results (Nicaragua), http://www.nlcnet.org/searchresults
.php?country=Nicaragua (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). Some of the reports cover several
countries, one of which is Nicaragua. Id.
511 Nat’l Labor Comm., KB Manufacturing (Oct. 10, 2005), http://www.nlcnet.org/reports
.php?id=454.
512 Id.
513 See Glass-Hess, supra note 317, at 334, 363. This is similar to the situation in
Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In Mexico, employers prevent formation of unions 
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to risk the wrath of maquiladora managers. Tensions between union
leaders and factory managers run high. In February 2003, Managua’s
newspaper La Prensa reported on a dispute between union leaders and
managers of Presitex, a textile company, saying, “Taiwaneses exigent
cabezas de sindicalistas” (“Taiwanese demand unionists’ heads.”)514
In practice, in Nicaragua, compliance with labor, health, and safety
laws depends on the good will of businesses. As a result, compliance with
labor laws was not a major expense for employers operating in Nicaragua
prior to CAFTA-DR, and CAFTA-DR does not change the situation. One
author says, “[w]ithin the body of [CAFTA-DR], the signatory parties linked
the capability to trade with international labor rights, providing procedures
in the event that one of the parties fails to meet its obligations under the
labor provisions.”515 She concludes, “the labor rights provisions in free trade
agreements, specifically CAFTA-DR, fall tragically short of international
standards and fail to produce any meaningful changes or consequences.”516
G. Textiles Presented as Nicaragua’s Comparative Advantage
This section turns to Nicaragua’s primary maquiladora industry:
textiles. The textile industry has become Nicaragua’s largest maquiladora
sector because people with few skills can be quickly trained to do the
work.517 Nicaragua has many people seeking work, but they lack skills
because of Nicaragua’s poor educational system.518
CAFTA-DR’s supporters say it provides a new competitive edge for
Nicaragua in textiles.519 They point out that, before CAFTA-DR, the United
by terminating workers who want to start them. Id. They are allowed to do so through
exclusion clauses. In El Salvador and Guatemala, exclusion clauses are prohibited but,
instead, workers who demand their rights receive death threats and face lengthy court
struggles. Id.
514 Adolfo Olivas Olivas & Martha Marina González, Taiwaneses exigen cabezas de
sindicalistas, LA PRENSA (Nicar.), Feb. 24, 2003, http://archivo.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/
2003/febrero/24/regionales/regionales-20030224-03.html. Accusations flew on both sides,
from the company and the employees’ union. Id.
515 Wade, supra note 483, at 645.
516 Id.
517 Interview with Noguera Cáceres, supra note 485. Mr. Noguera expressed sincere con-
cern for his fellow citizens and explained that he is doing the best he can to bring jobs to
Managua. He must work within economic and political constraints. Id.
518 See supra text accompanying notes 452–456 (discussing the economic importance of
education).
519 Dead-End Trade Deal Nears Dead End, WITNESS FOR PEACE, July 16, 2007, available
at http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/deadend.pdf.
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States required that fabric used in the Nicaraguan maquiladoras come
from the United States or Central America to get the U.S. tariff exemp-
tion on the finished product.520 Under CAFTA-DR, there is a new Trade
Preference Level (“TPL”).521 The TPL allows 100 million square meters of
fabric to come from countries that offer it for less money.522 CAFTA-DR’s
proponents argue that quotas bring cheaper fabrics into the country, which
leads to lower production costs.523 In turn, lower costs lead to more com-
petitive contracts as compared to those offered by other countries, such
as China.524 With more maquiladoras coming to Nicaragua, CAFTA-DR’s
proponents say more will be produced in Nicaragua with more employers
providing jobs.525
However, Nicaragua faces new impediments in the global arena.
From 1974 to 2004, under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (“MFA”), the United
States granted significant textile quotas to small countries, including
Nicaragua, and imposed highly restrictive quotas on larger countries,
including China.526 Post-MFA, the world of textiles is changing signifi-
cantly, and Nicaragua faces major competition from non-CAFTA-DR coun-
tries. For example, in January 2004, China exported 941,000 cotton shirts
to the United States.527 In January 2005, Chinese exports of cotton shirts
to the U.S. increased to 18.2 million, and Chinese cotton trouser exports
to the U.S. increased by an annual rate of 1,332%.528
The owner of a maquiladora in Nicaragua states bluntly, “China
can pay its workers less than what I’m legally required to pay these
people.”529 A maquiladora manager says, “[t]he TPL means nothing to
the brands. They only care about the wages.”530
The statistics on production and factories show that Nicaragua has
been hit hard by competition. From January to June 2007, the following
occurred in Managua’s free trade zone:
• There were thirty-fifty percent reductions in orders
from brands;
520 Id.
521 Id.
522 Id.; see also JARAMILLO & LEDERMAN, supra note 225, at 51.
523 Dead-End Deal Nears Dead End, supra note 519.
524 Id.
525 See id.
526 Id.
527 Id.
528 Id.
529 Dead-End Deal Nears Dead End, supra note 519.
530 Id.
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• Two textile maquiladoras closed;
• Seven textile maquiladoras fired workers;
• Two new textile maquiladoras opened;
• An estimated 3,880 to 4,120 textile jobs were lost; and
• 176 textile jobs were gained.531
Overall, progress was limited at best.
Moreover, the United States is in the midst of a serious economic
downturn that has been accelerating since the figures given above were
compiled.532 In the wake of this downturn, the closures, and the disappear-
ance of jobs in Nicaragua, neither the U.S. nor other foreign-based busi-
nesses can be expected to bring a meaningful influx of jobs to Nicaragua’s
free trade zones in the foreseeable future.533
H. Agriculture: Red Beans and Coffee Beans under CAFTA-DR
1. One-Sided Nature of Agricultural Exchange: Rojos Chiquitos
In addition to CAFTA-DR’s lopsided agricultural provisions that
benefit U.S. businesses in most cases, the U.S. government is working to
reduce reliance on a strain of red beans that is crucial for Nicaragua’s
domestic consumption.534 Nicaragua is home to a strain of red beans that
cannot be found anywhere else.535 However, the bean is not likely to provide
Nicaragua with a comparative advantage because the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (“USDA”) funded a research venture through which it de-
veloped a bean that has the same qualities as the Nicaraguan bean.536 This
bean, developed by researchers at the University of Washington, is called
the rojo chiquito.537 A representative of the USDA’s Agricultural Research
Services says “rojo chiquito is primarily intended as an edible dry bean crop
that U.S. farmers can grow for export markets in Honduras, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, and other Central American countries.”538 A major Nicaraguan
newspaper called the U.S. plans to complete rojo chiquito “potentially more
531 Id.
532 See Goodman & Norris, supra note 474.
533 See supra text accompanying notes 474–477.
534 Tom Ricker, Competition or Massacre? Central American Farmers’ Dismal Prospects
Under CAFTA, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Apr. 2004, at 9, 11.
535 Id.
536 Id.
537 Id. Rojo chiquito means “little red one.”
538 Id.
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devastating than Hurricane Mitch.”539 CAFTA-DR is “forc[ing] farmers in
[Nicaragua] to compete, not against U.S. farmers but against U.S. tax-
payers and the world’s most powerful treasury.”540
2. An Illusory Comparative Advantage: Coffee
Coffee provides nearly one-third of Nicaragua’s agricultural em-
ployment.541 In 2000, coffee comprised more than twenty-five percent of
Nicaragua’s total exports, making it the country’s largest export.542 Forty-
two percent of Nicaragua’s economically active workers owe some portion
of their income to Nicaragua’s coffee production.543 Therefore, at first
glance, it appears to be a product that can provide Nicaragua with a com-
parative advantage. This is not the case, however, because of the volatile
nature of coffee prices.544
A typical coffee plantation in Nicaragua is operated by one land-
owner with many tenant workers.545 Coffee is the only product; there is
no cultivation of basic grains such as rice and corn for consumption.546
Coffee prices often fluctuate wildly. For example, between 1997 and 2002
the “value of coffee exports [fell] by $4 billion.”547 The situation in the
539 Id. Hurricane Mitch was a devastating hurricane that struck in November of 1998;
Nicaragua and Honduras were hit particularly hard. See James C. McKinley, Jr., The
Hurricane Is History, but for Battered Honduras the Agony Lingers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1998, at A6, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03E7DF1F3
CF936A15751C1A96E958260&scp=14&sq=hurricane%20mitch&st=cse.
540 Ricker, supra note 534, at 10 (quoting Stephanie Weinberg of Oxfam America).
541 Press Release, FAO, Coffee Crisis: FAO Helps Nicaragua’s Small-Scale Growers: Seeds,
Basic Tools for 3,000 of Worst-Affected Coffee Producers, U.N. Doc. SAG/214 (Jan. 20,
2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sag214.doc.htm.
542 Panos Varangis et al., Dealing with the Coffee Crisis in Central America: Impacts and
Strategies 6 (World Bank Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2993,
2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2003/04/23/000094946_03040404262852/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
543 Id. at 70.
544 Madhav Jeyachandran, ResearchAndMarkets.com, Coffee Price Risk Management in
SMEs (Sept. 2009), http://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/81264d/coffee_price_risk.
545 For an account of the lives of some coffee farmers in Nicaragua, and how Fair Trade
projects are helping them deal with the multitude of problems they face, see CYCON,
supra note 438, at 164–82.
546 Id. at xi. This limits the ability of families to feed themselves, and it depletes the land.
“In many countries the farmers are keenly aware of the importance of interplanting and
maintaining biodiversity for the health of the land and of their families. ‘Shade-grown’
and ‘Bird-friendly’ were concepts well known to small farmers long before international
environmental groups took an interest in the coffeelands.” Id.
547 Tim Weiner, Low Prices Threaten Coffee Farmers’ Livelihood, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
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coffee industry was described effectively by an Oxfam report: “Asking
some of the poorest and most powerless people in the world to negotiate
in an open market with some of the richest and most powerful results,
unsurprisingly, in the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer.”548
With massive price fluctuations and the powerful negotiating with the
powerless, workers suffer.549
When coffee is sold at prices below the cost of production or does
not sell at all, tenant families have no income and fall into debt.550 With-
out paychecks, they do not have the money to buy beans, corn, and rice to
eat. A partial safeguard would be for families to grow staple products on
their own land. But, as tenants on the coffee plantation, they are using the
plantation owner’s land to grow coffee; they do not have their own land.
They have nowhere to grow food to feed their families.551
Low prices for coffee hurt people throughout Central America, in-
cluding Nicaraguans. In Central America about 540,000 coffee plantation
workers have lost their employment in recent years.552 That figure equals
almost ten percent of Nicaragua’s total population of 5.89 million.553
The reasons for the swings in coffee prices are complicated. One
factor is that the global supply and demand for coffee swing wildly.554 The
World Bank makes recommendations to countries around the world that
affect supply and often create more competition in the coffee market.555
Large roasting companies make purchasing decisions without considering
the needs of workers and landowners in Nicaragua.556 Moreover, climate
change is likely to continue to fuel the uncertainty and hardship surround-
ing coffee.557 In short, the factors are not within control of Nicaragua’s
coffee workers or the owners of the coffee-producing lands. Nicaragua’s
Sept. 19, 2002, at A7, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9404
E5DE1330F93AA2575AC0A9649C8B63&scp=1&sq=coffee%20prices&st=cse.
548 Id. (quoting Oxfam).
549 See CYCON, supra note 438, at xi.
550 See Weiner, supra note 547, at A7.
551 For discussion of the Nicaraguans’ need for land, see Anderson, supra note 43.
552 Jan McGirk, Growing Coffee: It’s Black, No Sugar, MSNBC, Aug. 2002, http://www
.msnbc.msn.com/id/3072120/.
553 globalEDGE, Nicaragua: Introduction, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/country.asp
?CountryID=136 (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
554 See CYCON, supra note 438, at xi.
555 See id. at xi–xii.
556 See id. at xi.
557 For discussion of the effects of global warming on coffee, see Andréanne Hamel, The
Impact of Global Warming on Coffee Plants and Beans, NAT. NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008, http://
www.naturalnews.com/022591.html.
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dependence on coffee has far-reaching consequences for her people. With
substantial dependence on one product, the whims of the market deter-
mine the livelihood of workers, the national food supply, and the overall
stability of the economy.
Workers in Nicaragua have spoken up, demanding their interre-
lated needs for food, work, and land.558 In 2002, more than 3,000 agricul-
tural workers from the Las Tunas area marched from the hills onto the
Pan-American Highway.559 They were demanding food, work, and land.560
After continuing protests and confrontations, an agreement was reached
giving them access to land to grow their own food.561 But, this is a limited
solution for a limited number of people that leaves the major problem un-
solved: people need land and a stable source of income to be able to provide
food for their families. “The current state of the global economy is placing
increased strain on food availability” and the resulting increases in food
prices are exacerbating Nicaragua’s problems.562 In Nicaragua, the rate of
inflation for domestic food prices increased from 10.7% annually to 34.2%
annually, comparing January 2006 to August 2008.563 CAFTA-DR fails
to address citizens’ interrelated needs for food, land, and work.
I. Environmental Laws and Conditions in Nicaragua
1. Nicaragua’s Environmental Needs and Problems
Nicaraguans have the same needs as all human beings: unspoiled
water, air, and land. These environmental needs intertwine with social
needs for adequate and nutritious food, education, housing, and medical
care. Unfortunately, Nicaragua’s environmental laws have not prevented
environmental problems, nor are they leading to the cleanup of existing
problems. This section surveys a few of the most severe problems.
“Famous as the ‘Land of Lakes and Volcanoes,’ and reveling in
its status in Central America as the country with the most fresh water,
558 Equal Exchange, History of Coffee in Nicaragua, http://www.equalexchange.coop/
history-of-coffee-in-nicaragua (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
559 Luis Hernández Navarro, To Die a Little: Migration and Coffee in Central America,
AM. PROGRAM, Dec. 13, 2004, http://americas.irc-online.org/am/959.
560 Equal Exchange, supra note 558.
561 Id.
562 Nadia McGill, Global Economy Worsens Food Access in Rural Nicaragua, ADVENTIST
DEV. & RELIEF AGENCY, Mar. 31 2009, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/
219487/123853469123.htm.
563 Id.
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Nicaragua . . . has very little safe drinking water. Those who cannot
afford to purchase water are extremely vulnerable to a variety of health
issues.”564 Land rights and access to land are another environmental issue,
and they are closely intertwined with social equity. “Most of Nicaragua’s
land issues constitute an expanding gap between landless farmers and
commercial logging, mining and agricultural interests.”565
A related major problem is deforestation caused by logging and
clearing of lands for crops and pasture.566 Even businesspeople question
whether 2005 legislation prohibiting illegal logging will have any effect.567
Lisandro D’Leon, a Nicaraguan environmental crimes prosecutor, esti-
mates that illegal loggers account for seventy to seventy-five percent of
Nicaragua’s wood exports, and that, at current rates of deforestation,
Nicaragua will have no more forests in ten to fifteen years.568 Nicaragua
has a new law against logging, but there is skepticism as to whether that
law will be enforced.569 The perspectives of the manager of the Nicaraguan
timber company, Exotic Wood International, are described as follows:
Black market cutting sullies the timber industry’s image
and distorts market prices. . . . But . . . he questions the
passage of green measures . . . in the absence of evidence
that the government can make its legislation stick.
“Nicaragua already has laws on the books to pre-
vent unregulated logging, they just don’t enforce them,” he
says. “So instead of enforcing old laws, they are passing
new laws.”570
Illegal logging contributes to social problems and inequities. For
example, the destruction caused by Hurricane Mitch was exacerbated by
the preexisting deforestation.571 Additionally, the use of pesticides on agri-
cultural land causes major problems.572 Pesticides used on fruit and cotton
564 Found. for Sustainable Dev., Environmental Issues in Nicaragua, http://www.fsd
international.org/?q=ntlopps/country/nicaragua/environment (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
565 Id.
566 Tim Rogers, Two New Environmental Laws in Nicaragua, ECOAMÉRICAS, Nov. 2005,
at 5.
567 Id.
568 Id.
569 Id.
570 Id.
571 Found. for Sustainable Dev., supra note 564.
572 Id.
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plantations have harmed several generations of Nicaraguan workers.573
For example, DBCP continued to be used in Nicaragua into the 1980s after
it was banned in 1979 in the United States.574 Health problems associated
with it include cancers, nervous disorders, and miscarriages.575 Many
people have died as a result of exposure to the chemical, and victims con-
tinue to suffer.576 “At the end of 2006, court orders against several multi-
national companies in Nicaragua (headquartered in the U.S.) were still
awaiting implementation or were the subject of repeated appeals by the
multinational companies.”577 In addition, cotton was a major export in the
1970s, hitting a peak during the 1977–78 season, but it brought the use
of ever increasing amounts of pesticides.578 This led to health problems
for workers, killed fish, and contaminated wells.579 In addition, insects
grew resistant to the pesticides, and pesticide use increased to the point
at which it was fifty percent of production costs.580 As a result, by 1990,
Nicaragua’s cotton production was reduced to less than twenty percent
of its previous level.581
Within a well balanced economy, funds can be allocated to provide
the infrastructure required for environmental needs such as processing of
drinking water, treating of sewage, storing hazardous and non-hazardous
wastes, and cleaning up of environmental contaminants. In a thriving econ-
omy, funding can be allocated to implement and enforce environmental
regulations. However, Nicaragua’s economy is seriously unbalanced, and
funds are not available for that purpose. Even the gains in GDP or GNP
in Nicaragua are illusory from the perspective of most Nicaraguans.
Economist Eric A. Davidson says,
[o]ur current system values the growth of gross national
product over conservation of essential natural resources,
and it falsely separates the economic system from the eco-
logical system upon which our well-being depends. The eco-
nomic pyramid must be placed within the ecological pyramid
573 Id.
574 Id.
575 Id.
576 Id.
577 Found. for Sustainable Dev., supra note 564.
578 Id.
579 Id.
580 Id.
581 Id.
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for either system to work well into the foreseeable, sustain-
able future. Futuristic technologies are not the most im-
portant ingredient for solving our environmental problems,
although some of them will certainly help. Rather, we must
change our way of thinking by acknowledging that economic
and ecological systems are interdependent.582
This article is based on the premise that economy, social equity, and envi-
ronment are interdependent. Nicaragua is unable to address the three
legs of the Triple Bottom Line; therefore, its development is currently not
sustainable. Economic policies underlying CAFTA-DR’s provisions con-
tribute to that lack of sustainability.
2. Nicaragua’s Environmental Laws
Overall, Nicaragua’s environmental laws are weak. They are basi-
cally a patchwork without a comprehensive plan, and there is little funding
for implementation.
The 1987 Constitution, with the 1995 Reforms, provides some pro-
visions relating to the environment.583 Additionally, there are general laws
for environmental protection, and they are supplemented by reglamentos
(regulations) and decretos (decrees).584 The Ministerio del Ambiente y Los
Recursos Naturales de Nicaragua (Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources of Nicaragua (“MARENA”)) administers most of those laws,
regulations, and decrees.585
The general law on environment is the 1996 Ley General de Medio
Ambiente y Los Recursos Naturales (General Law on the Environment and
National Resources).586 The legislature supplements it with other laws
582 ERIC A. DAVIDSON, YOU CAN’T EAT GNP: ECONOMICS AS IF ECOLOGY MATTERED 214 (2000).
583 Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] tit. IV, ch. III,
tit. VI, ch. I, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 January 1987, as amended by Ley No. 192, Reforma Parcial
de la Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua, Feb. 1, 1995, available at http://
pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Nica/nica95.html.
584 MINISTERIO DEL AMBIENTE Y LOS RECURSOS NATURALES [MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES], REGLAMENTOS/DECRETOS [REGULATIONS/DECREES], http://www
.marena.gob.ni/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=52&Itemid=170 (last visited
Mar. 14, 2010).
585 Id.
586 Ley No. 217, 2 May 1996, Ley General del Medio Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales
[Ley del Medio Ambiente] [Environmental Law] tit. III, ch. II, sec. I, La Gaceta [L.G.],
6 June 1996 (Nicar.), available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/nic7854.doc (recently
amended by Ley No. 647, 26 Mar. 2008, Modifica la Ley No. 217, Ley General del Medio
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from time to time. For example, the 2005 Ley Especial de Delitos Contra
el Medio Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales (Special Law of Crimes Against
the Environmental and Natural Resources).587 The Logging Moratorium
Law is designed to protect forests along the borders with Costa Rica and
Honduras.588 Timber is frequently smuggled out of Nicaragua across those
borders.589 The law places a ten-year ban on new permits for cutting
mangrove, cedar, mahogany, and pochote trees.590
Nicaragua’s numerous environmental decrees supplement the gen-
eral laws. For example, decrees which create wildlife protection zones,
such as the Protecciòn a los Animales Silvestres Consiguina Zona de Asilo
(Protection of Wildlife in the Consiguina Zone of Asylum),591 supplement
the Nueva Ley Para la Protecciòn de Nuestra Fauna Nacional (New Law
for Protection of Our National Fauna),592 and the Prohíbese Apprehensión
y Caza de Toda Clase de Animales Silvestres y Exportación de Tuevo de
Tortugas (Prohibition Against Catching and Hunting of All Types of Wild
Animals and Export of Turtle Eggs).593 Additionally, Nicaragua has a
series of reglamentos (regulations) providing guidance for enforcement
of the general laws and decrees.594
Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales, La Gaceta [L.G.], 3 Apr. 2008 (Nicar.), available at
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/nic86097.doc).
587 Ley No. 559, 26 Oct. 2005, Ley de Delitos Contra el Medio Ambiente y los Recursos
Naturales, La Gaceta [L.G.], 21 Nov. 2005 (Nicar.), available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/
texts/nic63374.doc.
588 Rogers, supra note 566, at 5.
589 Id.
590 Id.
591 Decreto No. 13, Protecciòn a los Animales Silvestres Consiguina Zona de Asilo, La Gaceta
[L.G.] 206, 3 Nov. 1956; see also Comisiòn Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo,
Legislación y Políticas, http://www.ccad.ws/legislacion/Nicaragua.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2010).
592 See, e.g., Convenciòn sobre el Comercio Internacional de Especies Amenazadas de Fauna
y Flora Silvestres (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora), Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S 243.
593 Ley No. 625, 28 Mar. 1977, Prohíbese Apprehensión y Caza de Toda Clase de Animales
Silvestres, y Exportación de Huevos de Tortugas, La Gaceta [L.G.], 16 May 1977 (Nicar.),
available at http://www.marena.gob.ni/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=181
&func=startdown&id=46. Text and description of Nicaragua’s laws are available through
a website provided by ECOLEX, http://www.ecolex.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). This
website provides copies and summaries of environmental law for countries around the
world. ECOLEX is operated by the United Nations Environmental Programme (“UNEP”),
the FAO, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”). For a com-
prehensive list (in Spanish) of Nicaragua’s Decrees and links to them, see Ministerio
de Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales, http://www.marena.gob.ni/index.php?option=com
_remository&Itemid=181&func=select&id=2 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
594 MINISTERIO DEL AMBIENTE Y LOS RECURSOS NATURALES, supra note 584.
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3. What Is Needed?
CAFTA-DR, like its predecessor NAFTA, is based on the assump-
tion that free trade will lead to a trickle-down effect of economic benefits
that raise the standard of living of citizens in all member countries.595 This
trickle-down effect is expected to allow citizens to meet their needs in terms
of food, housing, education, health care, water supplies, and myriad others.
It is all supposed to happen through comparative advantage.596 Sadly, it has
not worked under NAFTA, nor is it likely to happen under CAFTA-DR.
A look at the individual members of CAFTA-DR shows their elu-
sive comparative advantages—such as human beings who will work for
extremely low wages—cannot generate the trickle-down and rising tides
needed.597 A more in-depth analysis of Nicaragua confirms that premise.598
Examination of Nicaragua’s situation through the lens of the Triple
Bottom Line reveals CAFTA-DR allows unsustainable practices or even
exacerbates them. Therefore, new ways of doing things must be identified
and adopted. In-depth discussion of alternatives is beyond the scope of this
article, but a few will be introduced here. Change can and should begin
with individuals in every sector of society. That includes government
officials, business executives, and private citizens from the United States
as well as other developed nations.
Many writers in recent years have alerted people to the problems
of a top-down approach to economics. In short, profit-driven motives of cor-
porate leaders take precedence over the needs of citizens in developing and
developed countries.599 Those who have issued such warnings include, for
example, John Perkins, author of Confessions of an Economic Hit Man600
and The Secret History of the American Empire: Economic Hit Men,
Jackals, and the Truth about Global Corruption.601 In both books, he pro-
vides disturbing accounts of how U.S. government leaders help businesses
595 J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-
UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA-DR) 3–4 (2008), available at http://www
.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL31870.pdf.
596 Id.
597 See Sandra Polaski & Viji Rangaswami, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, CAFTA-DR:
No Pride in a Teaspoon of Sugar a Week (May 12, 2005), http://www.carnegieendowment
.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16924.
598 See supra text accompanying notes 483–516.
599 See JOHN PERKINS, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: ECONOMIC HIT
MEN, JACKALS, AND THE TRUTH ABOUT GLOBAL CORRUPTION 2–3 (2007).
600 JOHN PERKINS, CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN (2004).
601 PERKINS, supra note 599.
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by promoting agreements and projects that leave developing nations in
massive debt.602 In When Corporations Rule the World, David Korten
describes how corporate power benefits companies and investors, but de-
stroys democratic institutions and ecosystems.603 He blames corporations
for many of the environmental and social problems around the world.604
In the wake of such revelations, however, those same authors and
many others are speaking of the readiness of people around the world to
move into a new era.605 In The Post Corporate World, Korten sets out his
hopes for a new system of market economies that honor principles advo-
cated by Adam Smith.606 In The Great Turning, Korten explores how and
why people must transform “a corporate-led global economy to a plane-
tary system of community-led local living economies.”607 He describes the
need for strong communities as a foundation for security and economic
stability.608 Perkins works through the Dream Change Coalition, a non-
profit organization through which people around the world join to create
and practice sustainable ways of living.609 Dr. Ervin Laszlo, a philosopher
of science and systems theorist, speaks of an overall shift of consciousness
in this world and the desire to change in the face of myriad problems.610
He uses words that parallel those of many who supported NAFTA and
CAFTA-DR: A “rising tide should and will lift all boats.”611 There is truth
602 Id. at 2–3; PERKINS, supra note 600, at x–xi.
603 DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD passim (1995).
604 Id.
605 See, e.g., DAVID C. KORTEN, THE GREAT TURNING: FROM EMPIRE TO EARTH COMMUNITY
21 (2006) (calling for an end to the “five-thousand-year era of Empire that has reproduced
hierarchies of domination at all levels of human organization”); PAUL HAWKEN, BLESSED
UNREST: HOW THE LARGEST MOVEMENT IN THE WORLD CAME INTO BEING AND WHY NO
ONE SAW IT COMING 22 (2007).
606 DAVID C. KORTEN, THE POST-CORPORATE WORLD: LIFE AFTER CAPITALISM 152–62 (1999).
607 KORTEN, supra note 605, at 15.
608 Id. at 14–15. DAVID C. KORTEN, AGENDA FOR A NEW ECONOMY: FROM PHANTOM WEALTH
TO REAL WEALTH (2009) continues this discussion of ways to move away from the economic
crisis faced by the United States.
609 For information about the Dream Change Coalition and information about seminars
and books as well as links to information about programs around the world, see http://
www.dreamchange.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). The website includes links to hun-
dreds of groups (“Wakeful Organizations”) working to protect the earth in areas including
building sustainability, business as an agent of change, community wisdom, cross-cultural
& sacred expeditions, earth stewardship, ecology & sustainability, education, Fair Trade
& indigenous rights, forest preservation, and green chemistries & biotechnologies. Id.
610 One Minute Shift, Ervin Laszlo on 2012, http://oneminuteshift.com/videos/ervin_laszlo
_video/2012 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). Dr. Laszlo is from Hungary and is a systems and
integral theorist. Id.
611 Id.
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in the adage, but free trade agreements do not illustrate this truth. Neither
NAFTA nor CAFTA-DR creates a trickle-down that can raise the tide and
lift the lives of most citizens in its developing members.
Therefore, it is time to seek new ways to promote free trade that
is truly sustainable trade. Alternatives are needed that will truly raise
the tides for citizens throughout the countries that participate in trade
agreements.
In a recent letter to the editor of TIME, U.S. Senator Sherrod
Brown responded to proposals to deal with the U.S. annual trade deficit
of $800 billion, saying, “[i]t takes real change in trade policy—labor and
environmental standards that will raise living standards at home and
abroad, . . . and no more NAFTAs and other corporate trade deals. We
need more trade—but under a very different set of rules that work for our
families and our communities.”612 The conclusions presented in this article
parallel Senator Brown’s conclusions. The world needs a rising tide that
will lift families and communities, not just corporate stakeholders.
The need for that rising tide is being recognized now, step-by-step.
People around the world are working toward new ways to promote sustain-
able development. Paul Hawken describes a worldwide movement of people
working to heal the planet in Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement
in the World Came into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming.613 Andres
R. Edwards describes how the world is on the cusp of a sustainability revo-
lution in The Sustainability Revolution: Portrait of a Paradigm Shift.614
“The Sustainability Revolution presents an alternative that supports eco-
nomic viability and healthy ecosystems by modifying consumption patterns
and implementing a more equitable social framework.”615 This article is
designed to be part of a wake-up call. The effects of free trade on Nicaragua
are unsustainable and unacceptable. The example of Nicaragua demon-
strates that CAFTA-DR does not work in a small, poor, developing country.
After awakening, the next step is to choose a different path and
take action. Korten, Perkins, Hawken, Edwards, and tens of thousands
of other thoughtful and committed people around the world are taking
specific steps to work toward the new sustainability paradigm. One way
is through microloans from organizations such as the Grameen Bank,616
612 Sen. Sherrod Brown, Letter to the Editor, The Art of the Export, TIME, June 23, 2008,
at 10.
613 HAWKEN, supra note 605 passim.
614 EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 50.
615 Id. at 3.
616 This program was founded by Professor Muhammad Yunnus in 1976. Grameen Bank,
A Short History of Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com
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Kiva,617 and MicroPlace.618 A second way is through the promotion of
organic foods, which protects consumers and agricultural workers from
the effects of harmful chemicals.619 Another way is through Fair Trade,
a process that promotes sustainable development through the implemen-
tation of multiple principles and practices.620 “Characteristics of [F]air
[T]rade include fair wages, cooperative workplaces, consumer education,
environmental sustainability, direct trade, financial and technical sup-
port [for producers], community development, respect for cultural iden-
tity, and public accountability (transparency).”621 It is a process that should
be explored for the benefit of Nicaragua, other developing countries, and
developed countries.
As more people become aware of the reality of human interdepen-
dence, human beings will have the ability to shift in a positive direction.
Much of the discord related to the effects of CAFTA-DR and other trade
agreements can give way to more cooperative efforts from the ground up
to help each other. In doing so, people will promote a strong economy,
social equity, and a healthy environment. This article illustrates that
Nicaragua’s economic, social, and environmental problems are interde-
pendent. Nicaragua’s problems are illustrative of the problems of the other
five developing members of CAFTA-DR. The example of one small nation
provides important lessons for countries throughout the world.
_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=164 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). It now makes loans
in at least 43 countries. Grameen Bank, Micro Loans for the Very Poor, http://www
.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=336&Itemid=373 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2010).
617 For information about KIVA, through which anyone wishing to help can be linked to
an entrepreneur who needs a small loan, see Kiva: Loans that Change Lives, http://kiva
.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). KIVA makes loans to people in Nicaragua and other
developing countries. See Kiva, Kiva’s Field Partners, http://www.kiva.org/partners (last
visited Mar. 14, 2010), for a list of the partners through which Kiva lends.
618 MicroPlace, https://www.microplace.com/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). MicroPlace is a
subsidiary of eBay that was started in 2006 and operates in a similar way to KIVA except
that lenders earn interest. MicroPlace, MicroPlace History, https://www.microplace.com/
learn_more/history (last visited Mar. 14, 2010); MicroPlace, How MicroPlace Works, https:/
/www.microplace.com/learn_more/howitworks (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
619 The United States and many other countries have legislation establishing processes
for certification and regulation of organic foods. See Organic Foods Production Act of 1990,
7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006). For a list of 385 organizations from around the world that certify
organic foods, see Organic (Ltd), Certify, http://www.organic.com.au/certify/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2010).
620 Paulette L. Stenzel, What Is Fair Trade?, GLOBALEDGE BUS. REV., Vol. 2, No. 5, 2008,
at 1, available at http://globaledge.msu.edu/NewsAndViews/businessReviews/gBR2-5.pdf.
621 Id.
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VI. THE BOTTOM LINE: WILL CAFTA-DR BRING SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT TO NICARAGUA?
Inquiry into Nicaragua’s economic, social, legal, and environmental
climate helps answer the question: Does, or can, CAFTA-DR promote sus-
tainable development in Nicaragua? Using the three legs of the Triple
Bottom Line to construct a response, CAFTA-DR does not. This section
will summarize what this article reveals.
Economic growth under CAFTA-DR will continue to be distributed
unevenly. Foreign investors as well as business owners in Nicaragua gain
a variety of benefits. For a period of seventeen years preceding CAFTA-
DR, companies in the free trade zones enjoyed extraordinary freedom
from taxes.622 During those years, the activities of companies in the free
trade zones failed to lift the lives of Nicaragua’s people in meaningful ways,
and CAFTA-DR perpetuates that system. Under CAFTA-DR, factory
owners continue to be exempt from a bundle of taxes: export, property,
and sales.623 Nicaragua’s leaders feel that they have no option but to give
up taxes in order to lure investors. Therefore, economic activity brought
by CAFTA-DR will not generate the funds Nicaragua needs for infra-
structure improvements. Thus, the economic leg of the Triple Bottom Line
is unstable.
CAFTA-DR lacks mechanisms needed to establish essential social
equity. Limited numbers of people may have gotten jobs in Nicaragua be-
cause of CAFTA-DR, but even those jobs have disappeared in the worldwide
economic recession of 2008–09. Wages earned by maquiladora workers are
barely sufficient to buy the rice and beans for gallo pinto, the staple of the
diet of most Nicaraguans.624 People continue to live on dumpsites such as
La Chureca.625 In fact, the number of residents there is growing, and there
are similar sites in other cities such as León.626 People lack drinking water,
622 See supra text accompanying notes 480–482 (describing some of the tax privileges
enjoyed by maquiladoras in Nicaraguan free trade zones).
623 See id.
624 Gallo pinto is made of red beans and rice that are slowly cooked over a wood fire. The
poorest Nicaraguans eat it for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Those who can afford it may
add a piece of cheese, chicken, or meat at the midday meal.
625 See supra notes 401–403.
626 Compare Chris Kenning, City’s Poorest Inspire Louisville Volunteers, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 20, 2005, http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20050220/NEWS01/
502200388/City%5C-s-poorest-inspire-Louisville-volunteers (estimating, in 2005, 700 resi-
dents of La Chureca), with Jeff Hoagland, Inspired by the Children of La Chureca, DAILY
LOC. NEWS (Chester County, Pa.), Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.dailylocal.com/articles/2010/
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sewage treatment, electricity, education, health care, and many other
social services.627 CAFTA-DR brings little or no prospect for change in
those areas, and the social equity leg of the Triple Bottom Line fails.
Finally, Nicaragua faces serious environmental problems. Massive
investments are needed to clean up contamination. Nicaragua’s environ-
mental laws are weak, and personnel are needed to enforce them. CAFTA-
DR does little to reverse the downward spiral of contamination of air,
water, and land. It does nothing to reverse the serious deforestation pro-
cess that has been inflicted on Nicaragua for decades. CAFTA-DR leaves
enforcement of environmental and natural resource-related laws to each
of its member countries, but these countries lack the resources to do so.628
In summary, under CAFTA-DR, prospects are dim for Nicaragua
on all three legs of the Triple Bottom Line. Moreover, Nicaragua’s fellow
developing members share those dim prospects. One commentator says,
“[t]rade agreements in the mold of NAFTA have been given a chance to
produce the mutually beneficial results upon which they are advertised.
They have been given a chance, and they have failed.”629 The experiences
of CAFTA-DR’s developing members confirm this indictment.
VII. RECOMMENDATION: INCORPORATE THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
INTO CAFTA-DR BY REQUIRING THAT BUSINESSES PARTICIPATE
IN THE GRI FRAMEWORK
The developing members of CAFTA-DR are sorely in need of
sustainable development as is exemplified by Nicaragua’s situation. Yet,
this article reveals that CAFTA-DR fails to promote sustainable develop-
ment as measured by the Triple Bottom Line. Tools to ensure that the
Triple Bottom Line is addressed through CAFTA-DR are needed. This
section proposes a new requirement for firms that wish to do business in
CAFTA-DR developing members. These firms will be required to partici-
pate in the GRI framework.630 This mechanism is a significant step toward
01/15/news/srv0000007336622.txt (estimating, in 2010, “upward of a thousand” residents
of La Chureca). For a firsthand description of the León equivalent to La Chureca, see
Wendy Barnhardt, North Carolina Ultrasound Society, Echocardiography Research Trip
to Leon, Nicaragua, http://www.ncus.org/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=49:echocardiography-research-trip-to-leon-nicaragua&catid=34:general
&Itemid=55 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
627 See supra text accompanying notes 399–411 and 452–456.
628 See supra Part V.I.
629 Brandt, supra note 119, at 113.
630 For a thorough discussion of the GRI reporting framework and its support for the
Triple Bottom Line, see supra text accompanying notes 79–117.
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sustainable development because it will require that firms examine their
actions in light of the Triple Bottom Line and reveal those actions to the
public.
A. Mechanisms of Proposal
A Sustainability Side Agreement should be added to CAFTA-DR.631
All companies that have a primary place of business in a CAFTA-DR nation
and do business in another CAFTA-DR nation will be required to adhere
to the new side agreement. New investors will be required to comply before
entering the new country, and existing investors would have a period of
three years to file. Reports will be filed with the GRI administration and
the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”).632
Under the plan, covered companies will compose sustainability
reports and submit them to the GRI administration. Even though some
companies currently report to the GRI administration every two years,633
under the CAFTA-DR Sustainability Side Agreement, companies will re-
port annually to the GRI administration. Initial and annual reports must
be simultaneously filed with the USTR. The USTR will publish this infor-
mation through a website open to the public. It will also publish a list of
companies that fail to comply. This proposed action will require a small in-
crease in staffing within the USTR, and a marginal fee from the company
filing its report to cover administrative expenses.
To ensure compliance, there will be sanctions for violations. Non-
compliant companies already operating in the area will have three years
from the effective date of the Side Agreement to comply. For new and
existing investors, non-compliance will include failure to file annually, with
both the GRI administration and USTR, after the initial filing. Companies
that fail to report to the USTR would be subject to fines of at least $10,000
and up to $500,000 annually, based on the extent of the company’s invest-
ment in the region. Any fines will be used to help administer the costs of
this program.
An additional and desirable provision would be to require that
CAFTA-DR countries promise to refuse permits to non-complying com-
panies for operation in that host country. They would also promise to
631 As a separate agreement, a Sustainability Side Agreement would require the signatures
and ratification of all CAFTA-DR members.
632 USTR, http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
633 See GRI Reports List, supra note 81, for a list of companies and their reporting
frequencies.
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revoke the permits of non-complying corporations. This may be impracti-
cable, however, for reasons articulated below.634 Yet, even if this provision
is omitted from this author’s proposal, the Sustainability Side Agreement
will bring many benefits.
B. Benefits of This Proposal
This proposal has several positive attributes contributing to the
Triple Bottom Line. First, the United States can set an example for sus-
tainable business, and the Sustainability Side Agreement can serve as
a model for other trade agreements around the world. Next, it is cost
effective, and a minimal administrative burden will be placed on the U.S.
government. In regard to business, there would also be minimal regulatory
burden for firms operating in CAFTA-DR countries. Firms would simply
have to report actions in the form of a sustainability report. The process
of filing with the USTR requires only a minimal layer of bureaucracy.635
The plan also allows companies to be monitored by an independent body
rather than government.636 This is similar to the widely successful ISO
9000 International Management Series and 14000 International Environ-
mental Series Standards.637 Moreover, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory has been successful because companies
do not want to be listed as major polluters.638 A company pays more atten-
tion to environmental issues when its reputation is at stake.639
For developing members of CAFTA-DR, this proposal may be more
problematic. It is probably beyond their political will, in today’s economic
climate, to refuse a business entry based on failure to file with the GRI
administration.640 In fact, it is asking a great deal of a developing country
such as Nicaragua to refuse entry to a prospective investor in the midst of
634 See infra text accompanying notes 640–642.
635 See USTR, Mission of the USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/mission (last visited
Mar. 14, 2010) (describing the USTR and its organizational structure).
636 “The [GRI] is a registered not-for-profit organization located in Amsterdam, the
Netherlands. It relies on the financial and in-kind support of generous contributors from
the network who ensure that GRI can deliver its programs and products.” GRI, Funding,
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/Funding/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
637 For discussion of these standards, see supra text accompanying notes 102–105.
638 Jeffrey C. Terry & Bruce Yandle, EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory: Stimulus and Response,
18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 433, 433 (1997).
639 Id.
640 Enforcement may be another problem. See supra notes 394–398, discussing, as an
example, Nicaragua’s weak legal system.
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an economic downturn. Nicaragua has shown herself to be in such need
of investment and jobs that she is willing to allow investors to enter and
operate in her maquiladora zones practically tax-free.641
Moreover, the weak and corrupted legal system in Nicaragua is not
likely to enforce such a provision.642 The ideal would be a world in which
Nicaragua can afford to deny permits and is willing and able to enforce
such a provision. But, even if this particular facet of the Sustainability
Side Agreement were deleted, the remaining provisions will be extremely
valuable because the U.S. will make important information available to
the public through publishing reports adherent to the GRI framework
and lists of non-compliant companies.
A filing with the GRI administration encourages a business to
examine itself in a critical way that is likely to lead to activities in the
CAFTA-DR developing members that promote the Triple Bottom Line.643
Firms can take action based on what is revealed through the GRI frame-
work to realize cost savings and improve their market shares.644 The plan
also gives companies a way to showcase outstanding corporate citizenship
in a format that the public will recognize.645 In other words, a company can
enhance its image in a way that is more than merely “green washing.”646
Moreover, as more companies participate in this process, the GRI frame-
work will become more widely recognized.647
The plan provides transparency that will lead to better consumer
and investor awareness of the need to pursue the Triple Bottom Line.648
641 See supra text accompanying notes 480–482.
642 See supra text accompanying notes 395–399 (discussing Nicaragua’s legal system).
643 See Interview by Liliana Anam, Manager, CSRinfo, with Scott McAusland, Press
Manager, GRI (Nov. 27, 2008), available at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/
6726F6B7-B9CF-463B-A106-11CC1B12979F/0/CSRInfoPolandNov08.pdf.
644 LAURA QUINN & JESSICA BALTES, CTR. FOR CREATIVE LEADERSHIP, LEADERSHIP AND THE
TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: BRINGING SUSTAINABILITY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
TO LIFE 4–7 (2007), available at https://www.ccl.org/leadership/pdf/research/tripleBottom
Line.pdf.
645 Interview by Liliana Anam with Scott McAusland, supra note 643.
646 For discussion of “greenwashing,” see Jonathan D. Glater, ‘Greenwash’: A Way to Say
‘Hogwash,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at G7; Posting of James Kanter to N.Y. Times
Green Inc. Blog, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/study-for-consumers-green
-is-greenwash/ (Apr. 30, 2009, 8:45 EST).
647 See Press Release, Soc. Inv. Forum, Number of S&P 100 Firms Producing Sustainability
Reports Jumps by More Than a Third; Nearly All Offer Sustainability Information (Dec. 17,
2009), http://www.socialinvest.org/news/releases/pressrelease.cfm?id=148; see also Interview
by Liliana Anam with Scott McAusland, supra note 643.
648 Mollie Painter-Morland, Triple Bottom-Line Reporting as Social Grammar: Integrating
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Transparency is good for all citizens in society, not just businesses.649
With information, people can take individual action in their purchases,
and they can speak up in the public arena in informed ways. Companies
may, in turn, be held accountable by consumers and investors.
Finally, the proposal supports the GRI administration’s credibil-
ity.650 The goal of sustainability is made more concrete through the use
of specific tools for measuring progress toward it.651 That is what the GRI
framework provides. As businesspeople and consumers become familiar
with the GRI framework, they will gain the ability to recognize meaningful
pursuit of sustainable development.652
C. Limitations of the Proposal
There are some limitations inherent in this proposal. First, the GRI
administration requires a firm to engage in self-examination and report
its findings accurately.653 However, the GRI administration does not require
that the company fulfill all three legs of the Triple Bottom Line at the
present.654 Rather, the process of reporting to the GRI administration re-
quires companies look critically at their operations, and the assumption
underlying this requirement is that this examination will lead to contin-
uous improvement.655 Another limitation is that companies will have to
allocate resources for staff and studies to generate the reports.656 While this
may initially be viewed as a problem for some firms, in many cases these
expenses will pay off in the form of additional business and better profits.657
Overall, the proposed action places reasonable requirements on
the investing companies. Additionally, the host countries will benefit from
investment by companies that focus on the Triple Bottom Line.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 15 BUS. ETHICS: EUR.
REV. 352, 352–58 (2006).
649 See Interview by Liliana Anam with Scott McAusland, supra note 643 (discussing the
importance of transparency).
650 See id.
651 See id.
652 See id.
653 GRI, Reporting Framework Overview, http://www.globalreporting.org/Reporting
Framework/ReportingFrameworkOverview/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
654 See id.
655 See Painter-Morland, supra note 648, at 356–57.
656 Tamara Richards & Debbie Dickinson, Guidelines by Stakeholders, for Stakeholders:
Is it Worth the Effort?, J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP, Spring 2007, at 19, 20–21.
657 QUINN & BALTES, supra note 644, at 7–8.
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From the perspective of CAFTA-DR’s developing members, a lim-
itation must be recognized. Those countries desperately need foreign
investment and jobs.658 Therefore, they may not have the political will to
revoke permits. This is why it is important that information be filed with
the USTR. Even if permits are not revoked by developing members of
CAFTA-DR, consumers and investors will have access to information about
non-complying companies and can make informed decisions about their
purchases and investment decisions. This proposal provides leverage for
CAFTA-DR members that do not have the political will or economic power
to refuse to admit an investor.
D. Viability of This Proposal: The Time Is Right
The time is right for this proposal. As discussed in this article,
people in government, business, and throughout society are questioning
the results of the free trade model underlying NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and
other agreements. This, accompanied by the recent economic downturn,
is leading companies to seek ways to stay in business. Some prominent
textile companies, representing a major industry in the CAFTA-DR region,
have found that sustainability and profits can be pursued at the same
time.659 As a result, some of them are turning to the GRI framework.
Within the last three years, the Gap, Nike, the Timberland Company,
Impahla Clothing, the Adidas Group, and others have submitted reports
to the GRI administration.660 It should be noted, however, that while each
of the companies listed has filed a report with the GRI administration,
some have only filed once.661 Thus, it is important to continue to monitor
such reporting.
Finally, the emerging and rapidly growing green economy is tied
to doing the right thing for the environment and society while making a
profit. Sandy Wiggins is a chairperson at a new bank that emphasizes
658 For discussion of how Nicaragua allows companies to operate in its maquiladora zones
nearly tax-free because it is so desperate to attract foreign investment, see supra text
accompanying notes 480–482.
659 See, e.g., The Case for Sustainable Business Practices, BUS. ISSUES BULL. (Int’l Fin.
Corp.), No. 4, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/mekongpsdf.nsf/Attachments
ByTitle/BIB-4-CAM-ENG/$FILE/BIB-4-CAM-ENG.pdf (providing examples of sustainable
textile companies in Cambodia and the Dominican Republic).
660 GRI Reports List, supra note 81.
661 Id. (Nike has only filed in 2007, and Adidas only in 2005).
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lending to companies that demonstrate their efforts to pursue the Triple
Bottom Line.662 She is quoted as saying,
[t]he financial industry has a large role to play in the
societal shift to a sustainable world. The emerging green
economy needs to be fueled by financial products and ser-
vices specifically designed to accelerate its growth, and ser-
viced by financial experts who ‘get it’ and who understand
the urgency of this shift.663
Considering the current economic downturn, the emerging green economy,
and challenges to free trade agreements, a Sustainability Side Agreement
is timely and necessary.
E. Summary of Proposal’s Benefits
Implementation of this proposal will be a significant step toward
sustainable development in the CAFTA-DR region. It will shift from mere
use of the words “sustainable development” in a trade agreement, to a
mechanism that actively promotes its pursuit.664 The proposal recognizes
that sustainability is a process, rather than an end result.665 Implemen-
tation of the plan will be one significant step in that process.
CONCLUSION
Lawmakers have used the term sustainable development in various
trade agreements, including CAFTA-DR, but they fail to define it clearly.666
Moreover, they fail to include provisions that will ensure the pursuit of
sustainability.667 Simultaneously, the developing members of CAFTA-DR
are home to low wages, and their environmental and labor laws are lax
662 See Region’s First Green Triple Bottom Line Bank to Launch in Philadelphia, BUS.
WIRE, July 14, 2008.
663 Id.
664 See DESA, From Globalization to Sustainable Development: UNEP’s Work on Trade,
Economics, and Sustainable Development: Background Paper No. 1, 2–3, U.N. Doc. DESA/
DSD/PC4/BP1 (May 2002), available at http://www.unep.ch/etu/wssd/BGpappc4fin.pdf.
665 See id.
666 CAFTA-DR speaks of sustainable development in its preamble and in Article 17.9,
CAFTA-DR, supra note 9, pmbl., art. 17.9, but does not contain a definition of
“sustainability.”
667 See DESA, supra note 664.
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and poorly enforced.668 Companies operating in the CAFTA-DR region take
advantage of these low standards, resulting in unsustainable development.
This article discussed the Triple Bottom Line, describing how it
measures sustainability by examining three sets of effects of development
on economy, social equity, and environment. As a next step, it explained
the GRI framework and how it is used to measure a company’s progress
toward the Triple Bottom Line. Next, this article used the Triple Bottom
Line to show that CAFTA-DR does not promote sustainable development
in CAFTA-DR’s nations. A more in-depth look at one country, Nicaragua,
revealed that development under CAFTA-DR fails to meet the criteria of
the Triple Bottom Line.
Therefore, this article proposed that a Sustainability Side Agree-
ment be added to CAFTA-DR. Under the side agreement, U.S.-based firms
doing business in CAFTA-DR’s developing members will be required to
participate in the GRI framework. New investors will be required to com-
ply before entering the country, and existing investors will have a period
of three years to file. Reports will be prepared according to the GRI
framework and be filed with the GRI administration and the USTR. This
mechanism will be a significant step toward sustainable development be-
cause it will require that firms examine their actions in light of the Triple
Bottom Line and reveal those actions to the public.
This proposal will compel U.S.-based companies operating in
CAFTA-DR’s developing members to examine their activities in the light
of the Triple Bottom Line. The results of this self-examination will be open
to the public. In return, consumers and investors will be able to make in-
formed decisions in light of the information revealed through the reports.
Overall, this proposal is straightforward, low-cost, and simple to adminis-
ter. Additionally, it promotes transparency, allowing businesses, investors,
communities, and consumers to make informed choices in the marketplace.
This plan serves individuals, businesses, and governments in sev-
eral ways. If trade is not fair, it is not sustainable.669 The United States
668 Citizens of CAFTA-DR countries tend to distrust their legal systems. See James
Flannigan, Comment, CAFTA Overview: Regional Coordination, Harmonization and Law
Reform: A Comment, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 231, 232 (2006).
669 To make trade fair, governments, businesses, and individuals must pursue many inter-
related objectives including respect for workers, wage equity, gender equity, cooperative
workplaces, education, respect for cultural identity, and public accountability. Another tool
for pursuit of those goals is through the Fair Trade movement, which includes informal
standards and certification programs for Fair Trade goods. This author is currently writing
a law review article exploring how Fair Trade promotes sustainable development.
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will lead the CAFTA-DR countries in a new direction, making trade more
fair for citizens in the region. Moreover, the Sustainability Side Agreement
will serve as a model for future trade agreements as well as amendments
to existing agreements. Under the agreement, the United States and its
CAFTA-DR partners will require that companies file under the GRI frame-
work and with the USTR. In turn, the USTR will make that information
available to the public through the Internet. Through this process, the
United States will set an example for countries throughout the world.
Adoption and implementation of the Sustainability Side Agreement to
CAFTA-DR will be a significant step toward a more sustainable world for
future generations.
